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Humans value fairness in themselves and others, but controversies exist as to how to allocate 
resources fairly. This dissertation explores ontogenetic roots of fairness by assessing 
preschoolers’ responses in situations where different principles of distributive justice are put in 
conflict. Study 1 asked whether 3- and 5-year-old children are able to take others’ subjective 
needs into account when distributing resources. Children allocated rewards to two recipients, one 
of whom was needier than the other, in two conditions: with an even and an odd number of 
resources. Results show that 3-year-olds use the equality principle as a default, but can distribute 
on the basis of need when resources cannot be divided equally. By 5 years of age, children’s 
concern about others’ needs is stronger and can trump the equality principle. Study 2 examined 
how children balance considerations of universal fairness with their own self-serving motives. 
Three- and 5-year-olds had to choose between two distributors, one of whom had previously 
been fair to everyone and the other had favored one of the recipients. Children either observed 
the distributions as a third party or served as favored recipients themselves. Results show that at 
3 year of age, children only prefer fair distributors in third-party contexts. By age 5, children 
choose fair partners even when it conflicts with their own interests. This developmental period 
thus appears to be the time when norms of fairness grow in importance and can override 
children’s self-regarding motives. 
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me tremendously throughout our joint graduate school adventures, including the adventure of 
writing a dissertation. Mike Tomasello is part of the family in all possible senses. Not only did 
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encouragement at all the stages of this dissertation project. I thank my wonderful dissertation 
committee—Drs. Sue Campbell, Mark Strauss, and Carl Johnson—for fun theoretical 
discussions and many helpful suggestions on the study design. I thank my amazing research 
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who ran the studies with endless energy and enthusiasm. I thank Roger Mundry for expert 
statistical advice and Julie Bowman for editorial help (and both of them for their patience). And 
of course I am very grateful to all the children who participated. 
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1.0  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Many agree that the key principle in the proper functioning of a society is the principle of 
fairness. Hardly anyone in the modern world (at least the modern Western world) would contest 
the view that people should have equal rights and be rewarded "fairly" for their efforts toward 
common good. In philosophy and other social sciences, fairness is considered to be one of the 
pillars of morality (Rawls, 1971; Haidt, 2012), something that makes us truly and uniquely 
human. Yet, while agreeing on its importance, people tend to disagree on what exactly fairness 
means and how exactly it should be applied. 
This dissertation focuses on a few controversies related to people's understanding of what 
is fair. Its main goal is to examine how the notion of fairness develops in young children and 
how they resolve its various challenges as their social-cognitive skills develop over the preschool 
period. Until recently, children's understanding of fairness at this developmental period has been 
virtually unexplored; in the past few years, however, research began to show that young children 
might have a “sense of fairness” (Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012), and to chart its 
developmental trajectory. The current work adds a few new pieces to the puzzle. I will begin by 
identifying the issues and reviewing the extant literature on the development of children’s 
fairness-related judgment and behavior. In the following chapters, I will present two novel 
empirical studies that examine (a) the principles that children use when deciding how to allocate 
resources, specifically, their ability to balance the equality principle and reactions to others' 
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subjective needs, and (b) children's evaluations of others based on their previous fairness-related 
behavior, specifically, their preferences for impartially fair partners versus partners who had 
previously favored them. In the concluding chapter, findings from these studies are discussed in 
terms of their theoretical and methodological implications for the research on the development of 
fairness understanding.  
1.1 CONTROVERSIES AROUND FAIRNESS 
One of the long-standing debates related to fairness concerns the criteria that ought to be used to 
distribute resources "fairly". Utilitarian theories of fairness (Mill, 1859/2003; Harsanyi, 1976) 
propose the principle of "maximizing the good": the distribution should lead to the maximization 
of the total welfare across individuals, irrespective of each individual's rights, merits, needs etc. 
Even if some individuals get more and some get less (or nothing), utilitarianists would be 
satisfied as long as the greatest possible amount of "the good" was out in the world. On the 
contrary, deontological theories of fairness, most notably that of Rawls (1971), focus on the 
individuals and their situations, positing that it is more important to grant everyone his or her 
share than to maximize the overall good. But the question still remains how to determine each 
person's share. Rawls maintains that goods should generally be distributed equally, unless an 
unequal distribution is to the advantage of the least favored members of society. For others, the 
key criterion is each individual's productivity or effort (Adams, 1965). Lerner (1974) identifies 
several factors that contribute to the human "justice motive" and that can influence one's 
judgment simultaneously: parity (or equality), equity, law, justice of needs, social obligations 
and contract, Darwinian justice, and justified self-interest. Children seem to have some 
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sensitivity to (and arguably, preference for) equality very early, possibly in infancy, according to 
looking-time studies (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011); however, they are 
not able to make explicit equality-based decisions until school age (Damon, 1977, 1983). In the 
following sections, I will review the existing research on the criteria that children of different 
ages use when allocating resources.  
Another point of debate is how impartial should a person's "fair" decision be. In theory, 
we value "fairness for all"; however, when it concerns resource distribution, issues of personal 
relationships and reciprocity often come into play. Under varying circumstances, people may 
place different emphasis on different criteria for "deservingness" of recipients. In sociology and 
economics, a distinction is drawn between communal and exchange relationships: in communal 
relationships people have a broad sense of responsibility for others’ welfare, whereas exchange 
relationships emphasize exchange of comparable benefits and maximizing returns for the self 
(Clark & Mills, 1993). In exchange relationships, characterizing business-like interactions, equity 
rules—i.e., matching outcomes to each participant’s input—are generally considered appropriate. 
In communal relationships, exemplified by friendships and family bonds, most adults consider 
equality rules—i.e., dividing resources equally regardless of each person's input, or need-based 
distributions—again, unrelated to individual contributions—to be most appropriate.  
Evolutionarily, the motivation to be more prosocial toward certain individuals is believed 
to be based on two main principles: kin selection—promoting one's genes by helping relatives 
(Hamilton, 1964), and reciprocal altruism—helping others to the degree to which their help can 
be anticipated in return (Trivers, 1971). In humans, these principles are applied much more 
broadly than in other animals: we generally tend to be prosocial rather than not, even to non-kin 
and to people who we are not likely to ever meet again; however, when facing a forced choice 
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whom to help, the kin and reciprocity principles come back into play (Krebs, 2008). Importantly, 
in addition to direct reciprocity  —tendency to prefer people who have been or are expected to be 
nice to us—humans also follow the principle of indirect reciprocity, that is, the tendency to 
return helpful and harmful acts in kind even if these acts have been directed not to us but to 
others (Alexander, 1987). In economic games, adults tend to reward partners who have behaved 
fairly and punish partners who have behaved unfairly, even when subjects were not affected by 
that behavior themselves (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Singer et al., 2006). This ability to judge 
third-party interactions is important both for humans' choice of partners and for the formation of 
their own reputation in the group (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). Therefore, there are two types of 
values that people apply both to themselves and when evaluating potential partners: one is 
impartial fairness toward all; the other is special treatment for special individuals, e.g. kin or 
people with whom we are interdependent. How does children's understanding of these values 
develop, and which values do they appreciate? A review of the relevant developmental literature 
follows. 
1.2 CHILDREN'S NOTION OF FAIRNESS  
Jean Piaget starts his seminal work on children's moral judgment by contemplating the game of 
marbles, which, in his view, "contains an extremely complex system of rules, that is to say, a 
code of laws, a jurisprudence of its own" (Piaget, 1932/1997, p. 13). Indeed, determining and 
following rules, deciding—and proclaiming—that particular acts are "fair" or "not fair" (and 
often vehemently reacting to the "not fair" ones) are parts of children's behavioral and verbal 
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repertoire from quite early on. Studying children's fairness-related decisions thus provides a 
unique window into the ontogenetic roots of fairness.  
Classic studies of the development of fairness understanding, conceptualized as "positive 
justice" (essentially, justice in resource distribution) have looked at preschoolers and school-age 
children and have focused on their ability to make and explain decisions on how to distribute 
rewards among hypothetical others, or others and oneself. Following Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg 
(1969, 1981), who found moral judgment virtually non-existent until school age, Damon (1977, 
1980, 1983) has proposed a stage-like age-related sequence in children’s conception of 
distributive justice, with early reasoning based on one’s selfish subjective wish or some arbitrary 
criteria, then—progressively—on universal equality (i.e., the notion that everyone should get the 
same), reciprocity and moral relativity (i.e., understanding that different people may deserve 
more or less depending on their previous behavior or need), and finally, on the ability to flexibly 
coordinate the above considerations according to specific situations. According to this research, 
the transition from the initial level (selfish or arbitrary reasoning) to the second level (reasoning 
predominantly based on equality) typically occurs between 6 and 9 years, the notion of moral 
relativity emerges between 8 and 10 years, and the ability to coordinate equality, reciprocity and 
moral relativity—after 10 years of age (Damon, 1983; Sigelman & Waitzman, 1991).  
In a longitudinal study, Damon (1980) has shown that children aged between 4 and 9, 
interviewed on their conceptions of justice at one-year intervals over the period of two years, 
reliably followed a stepwise progression from one level to the next. This study used hypothetical 
stories about children who worked together (either made crafts to sell at a fair or delivered 
newspapers) and had different claims to rewards: some children were poor, some worked harder, 
some were well behaved, some were boys, some girls, etc. Children had to decide how rewards 
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should be distributed and justify why, and were assigned a score corresponding to their reasoning 
level. The majority of changes (over the two years’ study period) were limited to movements by 
one or two levels, suggesting that the progression in justice reasoning is quite slow and gradual. 
However, subjects who had low scores for their age at the initial interview were the ones most 
likely to change positively by more than one level the following year, suggesting an overall 
tendency for children to catch up with their peers and to ultimately follow the universal stage-
like sequence in positive justice reasoning.  
An additional factor that has been proposed to affect children’s developing judgments of 
fairness is the type of relationship between the involved parties, that is, whether the recipients of 
resources are strangers or close relations (McGillicuddy-De Lisi et al., 1994; Frederickson & 
Simmonds, 2008). Consistent with the distinction between communal and exchange relationships 
(Clark & Mills, 1993), it has been reported that distributive justice situations involving a sibling 
tended to elicit preference for equality norms in both children and adults (Thomson & Jones, 
2005). To further examine the relationship factor in children’s decision making about which 
recipients are more deserving, one study used the contrast friend/stranger as an independent 
variable, along with neediness and productivity, with 5- to 12-year-olds, and found that while it 
did not affect younger children’s decisions, older children tended to allocate more resources to 
poor recipients who were friends, and to productive workers who were strangers (McGillicuddy-
De Lisi et al., 1994), which is in general consistent with the communal/exchange relationships 
distinction.  
These studies show that the concept of fairness, at least as measured by verbal responses 
to hypothetical stories, is extremely complex and appears to be quite late developing. The adult-
like level of fairness-related reasoning, which takes into account the nuances of relationships 
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between the parties and each individual's contributions and needs, may not emerge until around 
9-10 years of age. Before that, the most sophisticated principle that children seem to be able to 
apply to resource distribution problems is the principle of equality. When and how does this 
principle emerge in the reasoning of younger children? And can their distributive behavior—as 
opposed to judgment—reveal a more nuanced understanding of fairness? 
1.3 FAIRNESS UNDERSTANDING IN YOUNGER CHILDREN 
Precursors to fairness understanding start developing in toddlerhood. To be able to understand 
that different people might deserve equal (or, broadly, fair) treatment, one must first understand 
that others experience subjective internal states, such as needs and desires. Children start to 
become sensitive to needs of others—for example, respond empathically to others’ distress—
starting around their first birthday (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992; 
Nichols, Svetlova & Brownell, 2009). Early in the second year, they also begin to be prosocial 
toward others by helping them instrumentally and informatively (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007; 
Liszkowski et al., 2006), with the range and flexibility of prosocial behaviors increasing over the 
second and into the third year of life (Brownell & Carriger, 1990; Vaish, Carpenter & Tomasello, 
2009; Svetlova, Nichols & Brownell, 2010). Two-year-olds are also able to share with others, 
especially when it is not costly for the child and when the recipient of sharing clearly expresses 
her need (Brownell, Svetlova & Nichols, 2009).  
In addition, a few recent studies have shown that children might have a preference for 
equal and equitable distributions (or at least perceive them as different from other types of 
distributions) much earlier than previously thought. These studies used looking-time and 
 8 
preferential choice paradigms in third-party tasks. When observing two differently behaving 
animated characters—one giving an object to each of two recipients and the other giving both 
objects to one recipient—16-month-olds seemed to know the difference and to expect a third 
character approach the equal distributor (they looked longer at this outcome than when the 
character approached the unequal distributor); also, when asked to pick a picture of one of the 
distributors, they chose the equal distributor more often (Geraci & Surian, 2011).  In another 
experiment with a similar scenario, 15-month-olds looked longer (presumably being surprised) at 
an unequal outcome of a food distribution than at an equal outcome (Schmidt & Sommerville, 
2011). Importantly, both these studies had non-social control conditions, either with inanimate 
“recipients” or with no distributor; in these conditions, children did not differentiate between 
symmetrical and asymmetrical distributions. Therefore, they reacted specifically to social 
situations involving distributions, and not just to perceptual features such as symmetry. Even 
though the looking time results in these two studies contradict each other, they suggest that 
toddlers do discriminate between equal and unequal distributions. 
What about children’s own distributive behavior? Studies by Damon and colleagues, 
reviewed in the previous section and generally converging on the absence of the notion of 
distributive justice until age 6, used measures that might have been cognitively and/or verbally 
challenging for younger participants, and thus might have underestimated their competence. In 
recent years, a few studies have attempted to examine younger children's concepts of fairness 
using behavioral methods and various non-verbal measures, with the hope that such methods 
would reveal a more nuanced picture of early development of fairness understanding. An 
additional approach to exploring these earlier processes that some of these studies used is to 
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measure inequality aversion—a construct that is a flip side of equality preference but that 
requires less active decision-making from the part of the child. 
In a study with 3- to 8-year-old children, Fehr, Bernhardt and Rockenbach (2008) 
explored age-related changes in inequality aversion, which they conceptualized as preference for 
allocations that reduce inequality between oneself and one's partner, regardless of whether the 
inequality is to the subject's advantage or disadvantage. The tasks were to allocate sweets to self 
and/or a partner. To reduce the possible confound of expectations of reciprocity, for each task 
subjects were paired with one anonymous partner. There were three conditions: (i) choosing 
between a (1, 1) allocation—i.e., one item for self and one for the other—and a (1, 0) allocation, 
which tested whether subjects would benefit the other at no cost to themselves; (ii) choosing 
between allocations (1, 1) and (1, 2), which tested for the tendency to benefit the other more than 
oneself (again at no cost); and (iii) choosing between allocations (1, 1) and (2, 0), which tested 
whether subjects would provide a benefit to the other that is costly for themselves. Among 3- to 
4-year-olds, the majority behaved selfishly, choosing randomly in the first two conditions—i.e., 
not taking the other's interests into consideration—and strongly preferring the self-benefiting  
(2, 0) allocation in the third condition. Five- to 6-year-olds chose randomly in the first two 
conditions, but were somewhat more likely to make a non-selfish (1, 1) choice in the third 
condition. A substantially different picture emerged for 7-8-year-old children. In the first two 
conditions, they were above chance in choosing the (1, 1) allocation, making sure that their 
partner received neither less nor more than themselves. In the third condition, 45% of 7-8-year-
olds chose the non-selfish (1, 1) allocation over the self-benefiting (2, 0) allocation (as opposed 
to only 8% of 3-4-year-olds and 22% of 5-6-year-olds). Taken together, these findings suggest 
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that inequality aversion emerges after 6 years and increases significantly with age, whereas 
selfishness decreases steadily from 3 to 8 years of age.  
As a follow-up of Fehr and colleagues' study, Moore (2009) systematically investigated 
4- to 6-year-olds' tendencies to allocate resources equally between themselves and others 
(presented as pictures) depending on who the recipients were: the child's friend, a familiar non-
friend, or a stranger. In several trials, children could either keep two stickers for themselves or 
keep one and give the other one to the recipient. In contrast to Fehr and colleagues' (2008) 
results, findings of this study indicated that preschoolers are able to opt for equal distributions, 
even at a cost to themselves, when the recipient is their friend.  
A slightly different approach, with a potential to reveal earlier understanding of fairness, 
is to look at children's reactions as recipients of fair and unfair distributions. A study by LoBue 
et al. (2011), using both verbal and non-verbal (facial expressions, looking) measures of 
inequality aversion, found that when 3- to 5-year-old children were themselves recipients of 
unfair distributions, they exhibited neutral responses when the inequality was advantageous for 
them, but were distressed and/or protested when it was disadvantageous for them. In that study, 
pairs of children were given stickers in reward for cleaning up toys, and in each pair one child 
received two stickers and the other received four. All three ages—3-, 4- and 5-year-olds—had 
the same tendency to react negatively when they were at a disadvantage, even though, when 
asked explicitly what was wrong, less than 3% of them were able to verbalize fairness-related 
reasons. There was little evidence for an advantageous inequality aversion (protesting when the 
other received less than oneself). These findings suggest the presence of an aversion to 
disadvantageous unfair distributions already by the age of three, which might be a precursor to 
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the conscious conceptualization of equality, emerging after age of six according to Damon 
(1983).  
In a further investigation of inequality aversion, Blake and McAuliffe (2011) devised an 
apparatus that allowed children (4- to 8-year-olds) to accept or reject unequal offers of candy that 
were disadvantageous to either the subject or the other recipient (an unfamiliar peer). Consistent 
with the study by LoBue et al., they found that 4- to 7-year-olds rejected disadvantageous offers, 
but accepted advantageous offers. However, 8-year-olds rejected both forms of inequality, 
suggesting that by that age, norms of fairness may grow in importance to the point of overriding 
children's selfish motives.  
In another study by Blake & Rand (2010), 3- to 6-year-old children participated in a 
Dictator Game, where they could share stickers with an anonymous recipient. Each child was 
given 10 copies of their most preferred sticker and 10 copies of their least preferred sticker. 
Separately for each type of stickers, children were asked to put some in an envelope for a child 
who will come tomorrow. About half of the children did not share at all. The percentage of those 
who did increased with age. On average, children (who did share) gave 50% of their least 
favorite stickers and 40% of their most favorite stickers; these averages were constant across 
ages, but frequencies of equal distributions increased with age. The majority of 3- to 4-year-olds 
did not share at all, whereas the majority of 5- to 6-year-olds divided the stickers equally (which 
was more pronounced for the low-value stickers).  
Another factor that may affect children's propensity to share fairly is the social situation 
in which the rewards are obtained. Hamann and colleagues (2011) investigated whether working 
together to get rewards would influence 3-year-olds' tendencies to share equally. After training, 
in which pairs of children worked together to receive two marbles each, in the test phase, also 
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after working together, one child received one marble and the other received three. Compared to 
control conditions in which no collaborative work was involved, children who collaborated were 
more likely to redistribute the marbles to restore equality.  
Children's sense of fairness is thus developing much earlier than thought previously. 
However, the patterns of their fairness-related behavior are quite complex, perhaps not less 
complex than those of adults. Preschoolers’ selfish motives seem to be the main obstacle to fair 
behavior; it is also difficult for them to share with anonymous others, most likely because young 
children have not had much experience interacting with people outside of their small circle of 
family, teachers and familiar peers. Children's sense of fairness seems to be most pronounced 
when they have some sort of a connection with other recipients (friendship or collaborative 
work), when they are treated unfairly by others, or when their own interests are not at stake. 
1.4 RESPONDING TO OTHERS' FAIR OR UNFAIR BEHAVIOR  
The ability to evaluate other people's social and moral behavior is crucial for humans, both at an 
individual level and at the level of the society. For an individual, assessing the other's past or 
current behavior can help predict his or her future intentions and actions, and determine whether 
this person is worth affiliating with or should rather be avoided. For the society as a whole, 
monitoring each others' moral stances and adherence to norms helps prevent cheating, free-
riding, and other types of behavior that present a threat to cooperative co-existence. In choosing 
partners, humans use both direct and indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 
2005).  
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Several studies have explored the effects of direct and indirect reciprocity on children's 
judgments and behavior toward variously behaving others. Similarly to the distributive justice 
studies, they have traditionally been conducted with school-aged children. For example, in a 
study by Harris (1970), fourth- and fifth-graders were given the opportunity to give tokens 
(previously won in a game) to charity or to an experimenter after observing the experimenter 
either share with them, give to charity, or not give to anyone. At both ages, children who 
observed any type of sharing were generally more likely to share themselves; those receiving 
tokens from the experimenter tended to share with her; and those observing her share with 
charity tended to donate to charity. Similar effects—sharing more with the one who had shared 
more—were observed in studies with first-graders (Presbie & Coiteux, 1971), fourth-graders 
(Staub & Sherk, 1970), and second- and sixth-graders (Keil, 1986; in that study, children's 
sensitivity to the other's behavior increased with age). Even though these findings point to the 
presence of direct reciprocity, they can also be interpreted as the effects of imitative learning: 
children might have perceived the other's behavior as a model and behaved in the way most 
similar to how she behaved.  
To assess understanding of reciprocity in a more explicit way, Berndt (1979) asked 4- to 
5-year-old preschoolers to judge prosocial acts of cartoon characters toward each other. Children 
tended to explain characters' reciprocity-based behavior in personal terms («The squirrel helped 
because he's nice») rather than in reciprocal terms («The squirrel helped because the horse had 
helped him»), suggesting that the explicit awareness of reciprocity norms might be limited at that 
age. 
Levitt et al. (1985) examined very early development of direct reciprocity. In their study, 
pairs of three-year-old children were separated by a barrier in the same room, and only one child 
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was given toys, which the other child could observe. After waiting for a few minutes for the 
children to share spontaneously (which none of them did), mothers of children who had toys 
encouraged them to share with the toy-deprived peer. The roles were then reversed. Sharing 
behavior of the child who received the toys second was consistently related to whether or not the 
first child had shared. Thus, some reciprocity understanding might be operating already at the 
age of three; although children's responses in this study could again have been partly driven by 
imitation. 
A few recent studies looked at how children's evaluations of others' moral behavior 
influences their distributive choices. One study, also focusing on reciprocity (Robbins and 
Rochat, 2011), tested 3- and 5-year-old children in a sharing game in which a generous puppet 
and a stingy puppet participated. At the end of the game, the child could punish one of the 
puppets, which involved sacrificing the child's previously earned coins. Five-year-olds, but not 
3-year-olds, selectively punished the stingy puppet. Interestingly, a group of 5-year-olds tested in 
rural Samoa did not show the same propensity for negative reciprocity.  
To our knowledge, only a few studies so far have examined the development of indirect 
reciprocity. Vaish et al. (2010) had 3-year-old children watch one adult either helping or harming 
another adult; then, children had a chance to help the harmful actor, the helpful actor, and a third 
(previously neutral) actor. Children helped the harmful adult less often than the neutral adult, but 
helped the helpful and neutral adults equally often. In a variation of this task where one actor 
intended but failed to harm someone, and another actor harmed someone accidentally, children 
were more likely to help the neutral and the accidentally harmful actors than the one who had 
harmful intentions. Children thus are able to use third-party information to form judgments about 
people, and tend to return indirect favors selectively to people without harmful intentions. 
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Another recent study (Olson and Spelke, 2008) examined factors influencing young 
children's resource distributions using a third-person giving task: 3.5-year-old children had to 
help a protagonist (a puppet) to allocate resources to other puppets, of which some were the 
protagonist's close relations, some had previously given to her, and some had previously given to 
others. On some trials the number of resources equaled the number of potential recipients, and on 
other trials the number of resources was smaller than the number of recipients. In the former 
case, when the equality option was possible, children tended to distribute resources equally to all 
the recipients, consistent with the previous research that established equality as the main 
operating principle for allocations by children before age six. But when there were fewer 
resources and children were forced to make a choice, a more interesting pattern emerged. First, 
children guided the protagonist to give more to siblings and friends than to strangers. Second, 
when choosing between puppets who had given to the protagonist (direct givers) and those who 
had given to others (indirect givers), they tended to prefer direct givers. Third, when choosing 
between indirect givers and non-givers (puppets who had previously kept all resources to 
themselves), children preferred indirect givers. Thus, in a forced-choice situation, children 
appear to apply the principles of both direct and indirect reciprocity already by 3.5 years of age.  
Similarly, in a study by Kenward & Dahl (2011), 3- and 4-year-olds were exposed to one 
puppet who helped someone and another puppet who hindered someone. The children's task then 
was to distribute toy biscuits between the helper and the hinderer. When they had a small odd 
number of biscuits, 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, gave more to the helper. However, when 
resources were plentiful, children at both ages distributed them equally. This, again, shows that 
young children may have some understanding of social situations, but it may be difficult for 
them to express appropriate behavior unless the situation forces them to make a choice.  
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A few theoretical and methodological conclusions can be drawn from the reviewed 
literature. First, children as young as 3 years of age do have a preference for fairness, particularly 
equality, when the distribution does not affect children themselves, that is, when they distribute 
something that they have no interest in, and do not serve as recipients. Under these conditions, 
more specialized questions about their understanding of fairness (e.g., about conflicting criteria 
for recipients' deservingness of resources) can be asked. When children's own interests are at 
stake, special conditions need to be created to elicit a fair response; since in this case they have 
quite a pronounced self-serving bias, even maintaining and restoring equality (like in the studies 
by Fehr et al., 2008, and Hamann et al., 2011) is challenging and can be viewed as prosocial. 
Second, even though under special circumstances children show some understanding of equity, 
reciprocity, and the like, they have a hard time acting on this understanding when an egalitarian 
distribution is possible. The "equality bias" overrides most other considerations (except perhaps 
the selfishness factor). Therefore, to examine children's more nuanced notions of various aspects 
of fairness, a situation needs to be created that forces the child to make a choice (e.g., there 
should be less resources available than recipients). Finally, there seem to be a few significant 
developmental shifts in children's distributive behavior, one approximately between the ages of 3 
and 5, and another approximately between the ages of 5 and 8, possibly due to children's 
growing socialization into the culture and internalization of norms (with the transition to grade 
school potentially bringing the biggest change). Fairness understanding should thus be studied as 
a process rather than a phenomenon.   
With all that in mind, we designed two studies that aim to add a few new pieces to the 
developmental picture of fairness understanding. One study explores a factor that is definitely in 
place in adults' judgment of distributive fairness and that children are likely to develop around 
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the same time when they start understanding equity; yet it has not been examined in young 
children: the "need principle".  The other study looks further into children's normative 
understanding of fairness as measured by their evaluations of variously behaving distributors, 
and compares children's fairness-related judgments in situations where their own interests are 
either involved or not.  
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2.0  STUDY 1. EQUALITY VS EMPATHY: 
DO PRESCHOOLERS CONSIDER OTHERS' NEEDS WHEN DISTRIBUTING 
RESOURCES? 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
The notion of fairness in resource distribution is as fundamental in human societies as it is 
controversial. When there is a limited amount of resources and multiple potential recipients, 
there are several ways to distribute “fairly”. The first, default way that comes to most people’s 
mind, especially in the absence of other information, is to allocate the equal amount of resources 
to everybody: the equality principle. But if we learn, for example, that some of the recipients 
worked harder to earn the resources, or that some recipients are in greater need, we may have to 
make adjustments to our distributive decisions. The widely accepted equity principle (Adams, 
1965) posits that those whose inputs are greater should receive proportionally greater resources. 
The Marxian justice of need goes further to take into account disadvantaged members of the 
society, with the famous slogan “From each according to his ability, to each according to his 
need” (Marx, 1875). These three principles—equality, equity, and need—form the basis of 
distributive justice in most human societies (Deutsch, 1975), although many other factors (e.g., 
pre-existing rules; recipients’ efforts or talents; considerations of reciprocity, etc.; see Lerner, 
1974, 2003) can influence these decisions under various circumstances. 
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In situations when two or more of these principles come into play simultaneously, one 
has to weigh multiple criteria to be able to allocate resources in an optimal way. For adults, such 
distributive justice problems are complex, and their resolutions are influenced by the knowledge 
of laws and precedents. But beneath this acquired, normative reasoning seems to lie an intuitive 
“sense of fairness” (Rawls, 1971), some elements of which are present quite early in ontogeny. 
What do children use as criteria for their distributive choices, and how do they deal with 
situations involving multiple criteria? 
Of additional interest is the developmental sequence in which the different principles of 
distributive justice emerge. Several recent studies have examined the development of children’s 
notions of equality and equity, findings showing that equality is the first to emerge and that 
equity follows—although, as outlined in the previous chapter, there is still much controversy as 
to when specifically this happens. However, the early ontogenetic roots of the “principle of 
need” (in the context of resource allocation) have remained unexplored.  
2.1.1 Development of the sense of equality and equity  
According to recent looking-time studies, it is possible that children are already sensitive to 
equality/inequality in the second year of life (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 
2011). Behavioral experiments with slightly older children have shown that by 3 years of age, 
children tend to actively prefer equal distributions. When given a choice to “help” a puppet 
allocate resources between other, variously behaving puppets, 3.5-year-old children distributed 
equally when the amount of resources matched the number of recipients; in addition, they were 
able to make more complex decisions when there were fewer resources, taking into account 
relationships between the donor and recipients and recipients’ previous behavior (Olson & 
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Spelke, 2008). In scenarios when both the child and someone else served as recipients, 3- to 5-
year-olds protested when things were distributed unequally (LoBue, Nishida, Chiong, DeLoache 
& Haidt, 2011) and tended to share with others equally, especially after collaborative work 
(Hamann et al., 2011) and when the recipient was their friend (Moore, 2009). However, when 
asked to share with anonymous partners, 3- to 4-year-olds were likely to monopolize the 
resources, and preference for equal distributions under these circumstances emerged only around 
or after 5 years of age (Fehr, Bernhardt and Rockenbach, 2008; Blake & Rand, 2010). The 
developmental picture that emerges seems to indicate that at 3 years of age, children's notion of 
equality is present, but still unstable and dependent on several factors, such as what they know 
about the other recipients, what their previous experience with the recipients has been, whether 
the number of resources matches the number of recipients, and, importantly, how much the 
children themselves want the resources. 
Another distributive principle that has been studied developmentally is the equity 
principle (matching distributions to work input). Lerner (1974) proposed that even though the 
different "justice motives" are often present in the same individual at the same time, equity might 
be the second important motive to form after equality (which he called parity). Just like with the 
other principles of fairness, it has been thought until recently that children could not apply the 
principle of equity to distributive situations until school age (Damon, 1977; Enright et al., 1984).  
A few recent studies have contested this view. Baumard, Mascaro and Chevallier (2012) 
told 3- and 4-year-old children a simple illustrated story about two girls baking cookies, one 
doing most of the work and the other taking a break to play dolls. Children then had to distribute 
two cookies, one big and one small, to the two girls (by pointing to their pictures). Children 
consistently gave the bigger cookie to the girl who worked more. Then, the authors repeated the 
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experiment (with a different group of subjects), with the difference that the two cookies were of 
the same size; after children distributed these two cookies, the experimenter "found" a third one 
that the child could also give to someone. Children's distributions of the two identical cookies 
were mainly egalitarian (one cookie to each doll), but the additional cookie was, again, given to 
the greater contributor by the majority of the children.  
In another recent study (Hamann, Bender, & Tomasello, in press), pairs of 3.5-year-old 
children participated themselves in a collaborative task that yielded rewards: they had to retrieve 
toys—4 toys at a time, coming out of two openings in a box—by pulling a rope together. One 
child's task, however, was more difficult, as her end of the rope had first to be retrieved in a 
complicated way with an additional tool. Children were familiarized with the game and retrieved 
two toys each in the training phase. In the test phase, children again pulled the rope (with one 
child, again, having to do more work), but the rewards "accidentally" came down unequally: 
three toys on one side and one toy on the other. Children who received three toys were more 
likely to give one to their deprived peer (thus restoring equality) when the peer had worked more 
than when the peer had worked less, suggesting some understanding of merit.  
Thus, when simple and straightforward tasks are used and when children's responses are 
behavioral rather than verbal, their understanding of equality and equity is expressed at a much 
younger age than previously thought: around 3 years of age. It is possible, then, that they may 
understand other principles of fairness (such as the need principle) at an early age, too.  
2.1.2 Role of empathy in fairness-related behaviors 
Empathy and fairness are often considered the two foundations, or "pillars", of human morality 
(Haidt, 2003, 2012; Pizarro, 2000). If fact, the philosophical tradition of moral sentimentalism 
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(Smith, 1759/1981, Hume, 1739/1978) viewed empathy (also called benevolence) as the driving 
force of justice in society. Empathy motivates prosocial behavior, such as helping, in adults 
(Batson et al., 1981; Hoffman, 2000) and children (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). As we know from 
the reviewed research, school-aged children are able to use empathy (or at least its cognitive 
component) when making hypothetical distributive decisions in interview studies (Damon, 1977, 
1980).  
But children are able to understand others' needs and react to them empathically much 
earlier, starting in the second year of life (preceded by an even earlier phenomenon of 
involuntary contagious crying in newborns; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976). Studies with toddlers, using 
simulated distress of adults and peers, have shown that between 12 and 24 months of age, 
children’s responses to others’ negative emotions gradually change from reactions of personal 
distress to more constructive, action-oriented behaviors (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992; Nichols, 
Svetlova and Brownell, 2009). Children’s helping behavior also emerges—and rapidly grows—
at this age (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; Dunfield et al., 2011). Whereas very early helping 
may be motivated by simpler mechanisms, such as desire to complete a goal, between the second 
and the third year of life children's ability to help in empathy-related situations grows 
significantly (Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010). In tasks involving sharing (Brownell, 
Svetlova, & Nichols, 2009; Brownell et al., in press), 2-year-olds shared when the recipient 
clearly expressed her need. Experiments by Denham (1986) and Vaish and colleagues (2009) 
explored affective perspective-taking abilities in toddlers, and found that already by two years of 
age, toddlers begin to be able to make appropriate judgments about others’ negative emotional 
reactions even without explicit emotional cues. It appears, therefore, that by the age when 
children start understanding equality and equity—roughly 3 years of age—they have a quite well 
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developed understanding of the idea of need, too, and can react to others' misfortunes 
appropriately.   
However, research looking more or less directly at the role of responsiveness to need in 
distributive behavior has only been done with school-age children. One study examined 8- to 11-
year-olds' resource allocation in a real classroom (Frederickson & Simmonds, 2008), with 
children's classmates as recipients of rewards. The classmates were classified beforehand as the 
subjects' best friends, acquaintances, and children with special educational needs. The subjects 
were told how much of work—a simple paper-and-pencil task—their classmate has completed, 
asked to finish their work for them (the task was pre-set so that the child subject's input was 
always greater than that of the absent peer), and then asked to distribute tokens between 
themselves and the peer. An age-related increase in children's sensitivity to both relationship 
type and need was found, such that older children tended to treat their best friends and children 
with special needs (irrespective of whether they were friends with them) more generously than 
acquaintances, to whom norms of equity were applied.  
A study that measured the relation between empathy and distributive justice indirectly 
(Malti et al., 2012), again with school-aged children, found that children's sharing in a Dictator 
Game increased between 6 and 9 years of age, and that increases in sharing were associated with 
the earlier developing ability to sympathize with anonymous others. This suggests that children's 
empathic responsiveness may be an important factor in their fairness-related behavior.  
However, no study to date has examined the involvement of the "principle of need" in 
younger children's distributive decisions. Our goal, therefore, was to fill this gap by exploring 
preschoolers' distribution of resources between recipients, one of which was needier than the 
other.  
 24 
The main question of the current study was whether children would give more resources 
to one recipient than another on the basis of need. To minimize the possible influence of 
children's selfish tendencies, the task was to distribute resources between two puppets (as 
opposed to sharing resources between the child and another recipient). We tested 3-year-olds and 
5-year-olds, because 3 years is the age when the other "fairness principles" appear to already be 
in place in some form (Olson & Spelke, 2008; Baumard et al., 2012; Kenward & Dahl, 2011). By 
age 5, children's social-cognitive abilities grow in complexity; for example, by this age they 
typically are able to pass the false belief task, which has been shown to affect sharing (children 
who passed the false belief task shared more, and tended to share more equally, than those who 
failed it; Takagishi et al., 2010). Fehr and colleagues (2008) and Robbins and Rochat (2011) 
have also found more sophisticated fairness-related abilities at 5 years of age than at 3. We thus 
expected that need-based allocations might increase between the ages of 3 and 5. 
Since other studies looking at various factors that affect children's distributive decisions 
found an "equality bias"—tendency to distribute equally when the number of resources matched 
the number of recipients (Olson & Spelke, 2008; Baumard et al., 2012; Kenward & Dahl, 
2011)—we gave children two opportunities to distribute: one with an even number of resources 
(thus allowing for an equal distribution between two characters, as well as other types of 
distributions) and one with an odd number of resources (forcing children to favor one recipient 
over the other).  
We hypothesized that younger children would have a strong tendency for equality and so 
would not differentiate between the two recipients in the trials with the even number of items to 
distribute. However, we predicted that in the trials with the odd number of items, 3-year-olds 
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might allocate more items to the recipient who was needy. We expected 5-year-olds to take the 
recipient's need into account to a greater degree than would the 3-year-olds.  
2.2 METHOD 
2.2.1 Participants 
Participants in the study were 28 3-year-old children (14 girls; mean age = 37.95 months, range 
= 36.03 to 40.11 months) and 28 5-year-old children (14 girls; mean age = 62.38 months, range = 
60.20 to 64.08 months). An additional 6 children (four 3-year-olds, two 5-year-olds) were tested 
but excluded because of experimenter error or refusal to complete the tasks. The study was 
conducted in a medium-size city in Germany, and run in eight daycare centers. All children were 
Caucasian and spoke German. The sample was fairly homogeneous in terms of socio-economic 
background (corresponding to the American middle to lower-middle class), except for one 
daycare center that was located in a lower-SES area of the city.  Analyses of the effect of daycare 
center showed no significant differences in any outcome measures. The study’s procedure was 
approved by the Max-Planck Institute’s Ethics Committee (corresponding to the IRB approval in 
the US), and followed the ethics and confidentiality guidelines of German research institutions. 
Parental informed written consent was obtained ahead of time. 
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2.2.2 Materials and Design 
Each child participated in 3 tasks, each task with a 3-item and a 4-item trial, for a total of 6 trials. 
In each task the child was asked to distribute toy items between 2 puppets, one of whom was 
more “needy” of the items than the other. There were 3 pairs of puppets such that each child got 
a new pair of puppets for each task type (i.e., same pair for 3-item and 4-item versions of Sad, 
Hungry, and Ill).  The order of tasks, as well as the order in which children received the 3-item 
and 4-item version of each task, was counterbalanced across children at each age. Also 
counterbalanced were the side on which the needy puppet was presented (to control for side 
bias), which puppet spoke first (to eliminate memory influence), and which puppet within each 
pair was needy (to control for possible preferences for particular puppets).  
Each child interacted with 6 puppets (3 pairs; see Fig. 1). The two puppets in each pair 
had identical faces but different hair and clothes. In addition, each puppet had some special 
features, which made it easier for the children to remember them in the test phase. In the Sad 
task, the needy (sad) puppet had paper tears attached to her face. In the Hungry task, the needy 
(hungry) puppet wore a clean bib, while the other puppet wore a dirty bib and was additionally 
stuffed to appear “full”.  In the Ill task, the needy (ill) puppet had bandages on her head and leg.  
During test trials, small (D = 10 cm) plastic containers for collecting the distributed items 
were placed on the table in front of each puppet. The same containers were also used for the 
training. The items that the children had to distribute were toy bananas for the Hungry task, 
marbles for the Sad task, and toy dice for the Ill task.  
Two female experimenters (E1 and E2) administered the tasks. E1 gave instructions and 
E2 manipulated the puppets. During the testing, E1, E2 and the child sat at a child-sized table. E1 
had a box standing next to her chair in which she kept the items to be distributed and the ball that 
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she used for warm-up. E2 also had a box next to her chair, in which she kept the puppets, and a 
bag in her lap, in which the puppets dropped the items that they received from the child.  
2.2.3 Procedure 
Children were tested in daycare centers, in a separate quiet room. The child, E1 and E2 sat at a 
table (see Figure 2 for set-up). E1 first played a ball-rolling game with the child for 5-10 
minutes, to make sure the child felt comfortable and at ease. Then the training phase started.  
2.2.3.1 Non-social training  Piloting showed that children, especially in the younger group, had 
difficulties focusing on the quantities of the items they had to distribute, because they were too 
interested in the puppets. Another issue was that many children were distributing items one at a 
time, alternating between recipients and starting at a random side (without paying attention to the 
number of items); as a result, in the 3-item condition, one puppet would often receive more items 
only because the child started to distribute on that puppet’s side. The training thus aimed to 
encourage children to (a) pay attention to the quantities of the items and (b) move the items 
toward the puppets simultaneously instead of alternating. 
For the training, E1 placed two plastic containers on the table in front of her; she then 
took four items from a box and said “Let’s see how we can divide the [items] between the two 
bowls”. She demonstrated the following distribution possibilities: 2/2, 3/1, 0/4 (sides of unequal 
distributions counterbalanced between subjects, so that half of the children saw the last higher 
amount on the left side and half on the right side). She always distributed by first dividing the 
items in two piles, then moving them all toward the bowls with both hands simultaneously, then 
dropping them in the bowls and commenting, e.g. “Look, now there is the same amount in both 
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bowls” or “Now there are more [items] in this bowl than in the other”. After each demonstration, 
she asked the child: “Can you do what I just did?”, moved the bowls in front of the child, and 
handed her the items. While the child was distributing the items, E1 commented and drew the 
child’s attention to the amounts of the items in each bowl. Then E1 put one item back in the box, 
so that only three items were on the table in front of her, and said: “Look, when I have only 3, I 
cannot make it so each bowl has the same. I can do this (1/2). Can you do what I did?”. The same 
procedure as for 4 items was repeated for 3 items, with demonstrations of two possibilities: 1/2 
and 3/0 (sides counterbalanced between subjects).  
2.2.3.2 Testing  After the training, E2 joined the table and sat across from the child. E1 was 
sitting diagonally from the child (see Figure 2). E2 took the first set of puppets from her box and 
put them on her hands. She also put the two bowls on the table in front of each puppet. E1 
introduced the puppets by saying their names and explaining their situations. For example, in the 
Ill task, E1 said that one of the puppets had been ill and had not played for a long time, whereas 
the other puppet had just played all day at preschool (for the script for each task, see Appendix 
B). E2 then spoke for each puppet, repeating what E1 had said and asking for "something to play 
with" or "something to eat". E1 handed the required items (three or four, counterbalanced) to the 
child and asked her to “give some to the puppets”. After the child distributed, E2 said for each 
puppet: “I got [x] [items]” (this was done to facilitate later coding from videotape); the puppets 
dropped the items in a bag on E2’s lap and returned with empty bowls. E1 then said “Oh, look, I 
found some more. Give them to the puppets, too!” and handed the child the remaining (four or 
three) items. After the second set of items was distributed, the puppets, again, said how many 
each of them received and dropped the items in the bag. Then they said goodbye and went back 
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to their box. After a short break, during which E1 played a game with the child and E2 prepared 
the next set of puppets, the second task started. After the second task, the third task followed.  
2.2.3.3 Coding and Reliability  The number of items given to each puppet at each trial of each 
condition (for a total of 12 codes, ranging from 0 to 3 in the 3-item condition and from 0 to 4 in 
the 4-item condition) was determined by a single main coder from the videotapes. A second 
coder, blind to the hypotheses of the study, coded independently 25% of the children at each age. 
Agreement between the two coders was 100%. 
2.3 RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to check for the effect of gender, daycare center, task order 
and condition (3- or 4-item distribution) order. None of these factors yielded any significant 
differences on any outcome variable, so all subsequent analyses were conducted on data 
collapsed over gender, daycare center, task order and condition order.   
The main result of interest was whether children favored the needy puppet over the non-
needy puppet. Table 1 shows the mean percentage of items given to the needy puppet for 
children of both ages, both when they had 3 items and when they had 4 items to distribute. The 
5-year-old children distributed more items to the needy puppet at an above chance levels for both 
3-item and 4-item trials (one-sample t-tests compared to .5, respectively: t (27) = 8.07, p < .01; t 
(27) = 5.49, p < .01). In contrast, the 3-year-old children distributed more items to the needy 
puppet at an above chance level only for the 3-item trials (t (27) = 2.89, p < .01), but not for the 
4-item trials (t (27) = 1.61, p = .12). 
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When the mean percentages of items given to the needy are compared using a 2 (3-year-
olds; 5-year-olds) x 2 (3-item, 4-item) ANOVA, there are no main effects and no interaction.  
Next, we asked how many children at each age favored the needy puppet, favored the 
non-needy puppet, and distributed equally between the two. There were three types of trial 
representing three different types of need: Hungry, Sad, and Ill. Children received one trial of 
each type in the 3-item format and one trial of each type in the 4-item format. Tables 2 and 3 
show for the 3-year-olds and 5-year-olds, respectively, how many children favored which puppet 
in each type of trial. For the purposes of these analyses, each child was classified for a given trial 
type as 'favoring needy', 'favoring other', or (in the 4-item trials) 'equal'. The distribution of 
children falling into these different types was then compared to chance using Chi-square 
analyses. 
In the 3-item trials, children could behave in one of the two ways (as the equal 
distribution was not possible): favor the needy puppet (giving her 2 or 3 out of the 3 items) or 
favor the non-needy puppet (giving her 2 or 3 out of the 3 items). Among 3-year-olds, more 
children favored the needy puppet than favored the non-needy puppet in the 3-item Hungry task 
(χ2 (1, N = 28) = 5.14, p = .02) and in the 3-item Sad task (χ2 (1, N = 28) = 5.14, p = .02), but not 
in the 3-item Ill task (χ2 (1, N = 28) = .14, p = .71). Among 5-year-olds, more children favored 
the needy puppet than favored the non-needy puppet in all three of the 3-item tasks: 3-item 
Hungry task (χ2 (1, N = 28) = 24.14, p < .001), 3-item Sad task (χ2 (1, N = 28) = 17.28, p < .001), 
and 3-item Ill task (χ2 (1, N = 28) = 11.57, p = .001).   
In the 4-item trials, there were three possible strategies the children could use: favor the 
needy puppet (giving her 3 or 4 out of the 4 items), favor the non-needy puppet (giving her 3 or 4 
out of the 4 items), and distribute equally (giving each puppet 2 items).  The majority of the 3-
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year-olds did not give more to the needy puppet, but rather chose to give the items to the two 
puppets equally at greater than chance levels in all three tasks: in the 4-item Hungry task (χ2 (2, 
N = 28) = 41.19, p < .001), in the 4-item Sad task (χ2 (2, N = 28) = 29.41, p < .001), and in the 4-
item Ill task (χ2 (2, N = 28) = 24.14, p < .001).  The 5-year-olds in this condition did something 
very interesting. Not a single child ever favored the non-needy puppet. Instead for all three tasks 
children were roughly equally divided between a “favor the needy” and a “divide equally” 
strategy. This distribution differed from chance in all three cases: 4-item Hungry task (χ2 (2, N = 
28) = 24.5, p < .001), 4-item Sad task (χ2 (2, N = 28) = 27.26, p < .001), and 4-item Ill task (χ2 (2, 
N = 28) = 30.57, p < .001). 
When the six tasks were compared across age, more 5-year-olds than 3-year-olds favored 
the needy puppet in 4 tasks: the 3-item Hungry task (χ2 (1, N = 56) = 6.48, p = .03), the 3-item Ill 
task (χ2 (1, N = 56) = 7.77, p = .01), the 4-item Sad task (χ2 (1, N = 56) = 5.92, p = .04), and the 
4-item Ill task (χ2 (1, N = 56) = 8.0, p = .02). There was a trend in this same direction for the 4-
item Hungry task (χ2 (1, N = 56) = 5.09, p = .06), but no such trend for the 3-item Sad task (χ2 (1, 
N = 56) = 2.82, p = .18). 
In summary, 3-year-old children gave more items on average to the needy than the non-
needy puppets in 3-item trials; also, more children at 3 years of age favored the needy than 
favored the non-needy in two tasks out of three. Three-year-olds distributions in 4-item trials did 
not differ from chance; the majority of children gave equal numbers to the two puppets, and the 
rest of the children favored one or the other puppet, inconsistently. 
For 5-year-olds, the effect of one recipient's neediness was more pronounced. Five-year-
olds gave more items on average to the needy than the non-needy puppet in both 3-item and 4-
item trials. In 3-item trials, more children favored the needy than favored the non-needy in all 
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three tasks, and in the 4-item trials, about half of the children favored the needy and the other 
half distributed equally. On the majority of the tasks, the needy puppet was favored by a higher 
percentage of 5-year-olds than 3-year-olds. 
2.4 DISCUSSION  
Previous studies of children's tendencies toward distributive justice have focused on their explicit 
judgments about how to distribute resources, typically in commenting on imaginary stories. In 
these studies, the youngest age at which children could depart from the equality principle and 
were able to take others' subjective needs into account was around 8 years of age. In the current 
study, in contrast, we examined children's actual behavior in distributing resources themselves in 
a simple and salient task, and we found strong evidence that children as young as 3 years of age 
already take into account how much individuals need the resources. 
However, the equality principle was still much in evidence in our study. The 3-year-olds 
only favored the needy puppet when there were an odd number of items to be distributed. When 
there were an even number of items, the equality principle was stronger. The 5-year-olds also 
favored the needy puppet quite strongly when there were an odd number of items to be 
distributed. When there were an even number of items, the 5-year-olds split in almost exactly 
equal proportions between favoring the needy puppet and using the equality principle. We thus 
seem to have identified a developmental period in which two key strategies for distributing 
resources switch in their importance for young children. 
We did not find any strong differences in children’s reactions to the three different kinds 
of need. The 5-year-olds showed exactly the same pattern on all three of the task types in both 
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versions. The 3-year-olds showed the same pattern on 5 of the 6 tasks, with random formants in 
the 3-item Ill task. We have no explanation for this one outlier, except that perhaps the story 
accompanying these puppets' presentation was confusing: it might have been difficult for the 
children to make a connection between being ill and needing toys to play with.  
The current results support our hypotheses and highlight two important facts about young 
children's early sense of distributive justice. First, young children's natural sense of empathy for 
others—as evidenced in many studies of their comforting and helping behaviors—also plays a 
role in their distribution of resources from as young as 3 years of age. Second, while the equality 
principle trumps these tendencies at 3 years of age when they are in competition, by 5 years of 
age, at least in some situations, their sense of empathy for those in need can sometimes trump the 
equality principle.  
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3.0  STUDY 2. FAIR OR NICE?  
CHILDREN'S EVALUATIONS OF OTHERS AS DISTRIBUTORS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Human social behavior, starting at its onset in the first few years of life, is governed by both self-
regarding and other-regarding motives. The complexity of these motives and the balance 
between them change as the child’s social-emotional development progresses and as social and 
moral norms are formed. Ultimately, to function in a society, one needs to be able to apply the 
same norms—norms of fairness—to oneself and others, and to acknowledge that others might 
deserve the same treatment as oneself. In addition, we monitor other people’s adherence to these 
same norms, and often treat others and choose them as partners based on their moral beliefs and 
behaviors. This combination of conscious concern about the welfare of others and social-moral 
evaluation of others’ behavior is crucial for sustaining human group living, as it enhances 
cooperation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004) and helps prevent free-riding (Axelrod & Hamilton, 
1981; Dawes et al., 2007). 
While much of human social interaction is structured by people’s evaluations of one 
another, the translation of these evaluations into criteria for partner choice is not straightforward. 
One principle that we universally follow is direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971): we prefer those 
who have been nice to us. Another principle is indirect reciprocity, which has its roots in 
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universal fairness (Alexander, 1987): we also prefer those who have been nice to others. Some 
situations, however, pose dilemmas that lead to a conflict of interests: for example, choosing a 
distributor who is nice to me could disadvantage other recipients. Studies show that children may 
start valuing fairness very early, possibly in the second or third year of life, preferring fair 
distributors to unfair ones (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Surian & Geraci, 2010). At the same time, 
young children’s social preferences are influenced by considerations of reciprocity (Levitt et al., 
1985; Robins & Rochat, 2011) and friendship (Moore, 2009). We also know that preschoolers 
tend to choose distributions that are beneficial for them (Fehr et al., 2008; Blake & Rand, 2010). 
Situations in which fairness and reciprocity are in conflict have only been studied in school-aged 
children (Shaw et al., 2012), with the finding that 6- to 8-year-olds prefer fair distributors in 
third-party situations, but are split when choosing between fairness and favoritism in first-party 
situations. Would younger children, who already value fairness but are still largely motivated by 
selfish motives, use fairness or direct reciprocity in their partner choice?  
The existing research touches on some phenomena related to this question, establishing 
different age-related patterns for various types of responses and various roles that the child plays 
in each particular situation. When children serve as observers, they appear to be able to judge fair 
distributors as more “good” than unfair distributors at the age of three (Surian & Geraci, 2010). 
When they serve as distributors themselves (allocating resources to others only), 3- to 6-year-
olds tend to behave equally prosocially toward variously behaving others when the equality 
option is available (McGillicuddy-De Lisi et al., 1994; Olson & Spelke, 2008); however, when 
there are fewer resources than recipients and a choice between recipients must be made, 3-year-
olds prefer direct givers to indirect givers, and prefer indirect givers to non-givers (Olson and 
Spelke, 2008). When children are passive recipients of someone else’s distributions, 3- to 5-year-
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olds seem to be fine with unequal distributions that favor them, but react negatively to unfair 
distributions that favor others (LoBue et al., 2011). Finally, in a combined situation when 
children make choice about how to allocate resources between themselves and others (thus 
serving as a distributor and a recipient at the same time), they tend to care about others’ interests 
progressively more between the ages of 3 and 8; however, selfish motives seem to predominate 
in their behavior at least until age 5 (Fehr et al., 2008). 
In most experiments reviewed, when a contrast was made between a fair (equal) and an 
unfair (unequal) distribution, the child either was not directly involved as a recipient, or was 
involved in such a way that an equal distribution was also more advantageous for him/her. An 
exception is one of the conditions in the study by Fehr et al. (2008), where the child had a choice 
between a (1, 1) and a (2, 0) distributions and where the equal distribution benefitted the other at 
a cost to the child; however, in that experiment the other recipient was an anonymous one-time 
partner, not even physically present during the task, making it challenging to apply 
fairness/equality norms to this situation. Also, the study by LoBue et al. (2011) demonstrates that 
more sensitivity to inequality might be revealed when the child is a recipient of someone else's 
distribution, as opposed to serving as a distributor him/herself like in Fehr et al.’s (2008) study. 
No study so far has directly contrasted preschoolers’ reactions to a fair (equal) distribution vs. an 
unfair (unequal) distribution advantageous to the child as a recipient. Such a contrast would be 
informative as children's preference for a fair distribution in this case would mean that they value 
universal fairness more than their own benefit.  
Partner choice in different situations may be guided by different motives. For example, 
we may like and respect someone with high moral standards, but we may prefer a not-so-moral 
but close friend when choosing whom to spend time with. It is possible, therefore, that children, 
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just like adults, would be more likely to prefer impartially fair distributors in some cases, for 
example, when prompted to evaluate them, but choose the distributor who favors them in other 
cases, for example, to perform the next distribution in which they know they would be favored.  
Thus, in the current study, we examined children’s choices between two distributors 
(puppets), one fair and one preferentially favoring the child (a first-party condition), in response 
to different measures that were designed to tap into different aspects of partner preference. We 
also examined children’s responses to an analogous situation, in which children themselves did 
not participate as recipients, but served as an observer (a third-party condition). In addition to 
children’s choices of partner in the first-party situation, we were interested in the differences in 
their responses between the first-party and third-party conditions, and in the possible 
developmental changes between the ages of 3 and 5. 
The current study directly contrasted children’s reactions in situations where  
(i) they observed others (third-party) vs. were involved themselves (first-party);  
(ii) the distribution was fair vs. unfair;  
(iii) the distribution was more or less advantageous to the child (in the first-party condition). 
Importantly, in this condition we compared children’s reactions to a distribution that was fair to 
them and someone else vs. the distribution that was unfair but beneficial to them (a distributor 
that prefers the child).  
The ages of the children in this study were again 3 and 5 years of age. Like in Study 1, 
the ages of the subjects were chosen based on previous findings which demonstrated that at 3 
years of age, children already have a nascent sense of fairness, but are still largely motivated by 
selfish motives—so, the contrast that we wanted to explore here might be especially salient for 3-
year-olds. By age 5, children are more likely to take into account other people’s interests (and 
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needs, as shown in Study 1) and have demonstrated significantly higher levels of various 
instantiations of fairness. Piloting Study 2’s tasks with some of the subjects from Study 1 showed 
that young 3-year-olds often had difficulty keeping track of all the transfers and making 
connections between puppets’ behavior toward other puppets and the subsequent choices that 
they had to make. Therefore, for this study, we used slightly older children: 3.5 and 5.5 years of 
age on average. Our general prediction for the developmental change was that selfish tendencies 
(expressed by choosing the unfair partner in the first party condition) would decrease, and 
fairness appreciation (expressed by choosing the fair partner in both conditions) would increase 
with age.  
The general set-up for the study was to expose children to two characters: one character 
who is always fair and allocates resources equally (Fair puppet), and another character who is not 
fair but rather guided by personal preferences and allocates more resources to someone who he 
prefers (Preferring puppet). The child was either involved in the game as one of the recipients, 
that is, was treated fairly by the fair distributor and preferred by the unfair distributor (first-party 
condition), or observed the situation, in which the two characters distributed resources to others, 
as a disinterested party (third-party condition).   
The specific questions that the study addressed were: 
1. Would children prefer a fair or a preferring partner as a distributor, and would 
that differ between the first-party and the third-party conditions? This measure, in which 
the child’s interests were most directly involved (because choosing the preferring partner would 
bring them more resources), focused on whether children care about universal fairness in the 
third-party situation, and whether they care more about self (view their own interests as more 
important) or about fairness (view their own interests as equal to other’s interests) in the first-
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party situation. We hypothesized that in the third-party situation, in which children’s own 
interests are not involved, both age groups will tend to choose the fair partner as future 
distributor. Based on previous research that showed that preference for equality increases with 
age, we also considered the possibility that older children will be more sensitive to the 
distinction, whereas younger children will be more likely to choose randomly. In the first-party 
situation, we expected younger children to choose the preferring partner more often than the fair 
partner, as that choice would be beneficial to them; we expected older children to choose the fair 
partner more often, as they will presumably care about others’ interests—and about fairness—
more. 
2. Would children judge one or the other distributor as being nicer, and would that 
differ between the first-party and the third-party conditions? This question gets at children's 
more abstract evaluation of the characters and at their understanding of how a "nice" person 
should behave. Children's choices of one or the other distributor in this situation would not affect 
their interests. We expected children at both ages to judge the fair distributor as nice in the third-
party condition. In the first-party condition, children's responses would reveal whether they base 
their liking of others on reciprocity or on universal norms of fairness. We expected that younger 
children would be more likely to do the former and older children—the latter. 
3. Would children themselves behave fairly or preferentially toward these different 
individuals, and would that differ between the first-party and the third-party conditions? 
To answer this question, children were given a chance to switch roles with the distributors and 
allocate resources—a potentially equal number of items—to them. In the first-party situation, 
children’s responses to this prompt would show, again, whether they are more sensitive to direct 
reciprocity (if they allocate more resources to the preferring partner), indirect reciprocity (if they 
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give more to fair partner), or are driven by equality (if they distribute equally). We expected the 
age difference to be in the direction of movement from equality to direct reciprocity to indirect 
reciprocity. In the third-party situation, children at both ages were expected to distribute more to 
the fair character; however, we also considered the possibility that they would go with the 
“default” equal distribution.  
In addition, children were given a chance to give one item to one of the distributors. In 
this case, we again expected them to choose the fair partner in the third-party situation, and 
expected an age-related transition from favoring the preferring distributor to favoring the fair 
distributor in the first-party situation.  
4. Would children affiliate with a fair or a preferring distributor, and would that 
differ between the first-party and the third-party conditions? This question assessed 
children’s perceptions of partners’ personal characteristics, and perhaps, indirectly, their views of 
how they themselves would like to behave. To test that, we asked children to choose one of the 
puppets for a subsequent game. Compared to predicted outcomes of the other sets of questions, 
we expected here that children at both ages might be more likely to affiliate with the fair partner 
even in the first-party situation, as well as in the third-party situation. 
3.2 METHOD 
3.2.1 Participants 
Forty-eight 3.5-year-old children (mean age = 44.03 months, range = 41.35 months to 45.89 
months; 24 girls) and forty-eight 5.5-year-old children (mean age = 68.23 months, range = 65.87 
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months to 69.44 months; 24 girls) participated in the study. Eleven additional children (seven 
3.5-year-olds and four 5.5-year-olds) were tested but excluded because of experimental error or 
absence of clear response on more than half of the trials. The study was conducted in a medium-
size city in Germany, and run in eleven daycare centers. All children were Caucasian and spoke 
German. The sample was fairly homogeneous in terms of socio-economic background 
(corresponding to the American middle to lower-middle class), except for one daycare center that 
was located in a lower-SES area of the city.  Analyses of the effect of daycare center showed no 
significant differences in any outcome measures. The study’s procedure was approved by the 
Max-Planck Institute’s Ethics Committee (corresponding to the IRB approval in the US), and 
followed the ethics and confidentiality guidelines of German research institutions.  
Parental informed written consent was obtained ahead of time. None of the children participated 
in Study 1. 
3.2.2 Materials and design 
The two conditions (First party, Third party) were administered between subjects. In both 
conditions, children were exposed to two types of distributors; the difference was that in the 
First-party condition, the child was one of the recipients of the distribution (and the child was 
favored by one of the distributors) and in the Third-party condition, the child observed 
distributions to two other characters (one of whom was favored). 
Each child participated in four tasks. In each task, a separate pair of distributors (animal 
puppets) gave toy items to the same pair of recipients. One distributor in each pair (the Preferring 
puppet) consistently favored one of the recipients, and the other (the Fair puppet) always 
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distributed equally. After the distribution, the child was asked to choose one of the distributors in 
response to 5 prompts.  
The order of tasks (that is, animal pairs) was varied and counterbalanced across children 
at each age. Also counterbalanced were the sides on which the Fair and the Preferring puppets 
were presented; which puppet in each pair was the Fair one; which puppet distributed first; the 
sides of the child and the other recipient (in the first-party condition), and the sides of the 
preferred and non-preferred recipients (in the third-party condition). The order of some of the 
questions in the test phase was also counterbalanced. 
The materials used for the study included anthropomorphic recipient puppets (one for the 
First-party condition, two for the Third-party condition; matched with the child’s sex); eight 
different animal puppets (four pairs) who served as distributors; a “pling machine” consisting of 
a box with an opening and a xylophone inside, making noise when something was inserted in the 
opening (from Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007); four sets of objects to 
distribute: marbles, dice, wooden balls, toy bananas; and two paper circles with arrows that were 
used by E1 to remind the child of what the distributors did (see Figure 3 for illustrations).  
The animal puppets that served as distributors were all approximately the same size 
(about 30 cm tall), were made out of soft materials, and looked equally friendly. To eliminate 
potential systematic preference for one animal in the distributor pairs, a preference test was 
conducted ahead of time with a separate group of children, and the animals were paired based on 
similar preference scores.  
The "arrow pads" (paper circles) were about 20 cm in diameter; one of them had two 
parallel thick red arrows (pointing to the same direction; the "II-pad") and the other had similar 
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thick red arrows but pointing to perpendicular directions (the "V-pad"). They served as 
identification markers for the two different distributors.  
The "pling machine" was placed on the floor under the table at which the child and others 
sat. It was placed between the child and E2 in the first-party condition, and in front of the child 
and equidistant from E2 and E3 in the third-party condition. It was used to make the distributions 
more interesting and the game more motivating, as recipients got to throw the items they 
received into the pling machine and listen to the fun noise that it made. The machine's opening 
was at the level of the child's chest and within close reach. In the third party condition, where 
children were observing other recipients and did not participate in the game themselves, the pling 
machine's opening was covered with a paper flap, and the child's task was to open this flap to 
"help" the puppets throw their items into the machine.  
3.2.3 Procedure 
Children were tested at daycare centers, in a separate quiet room. Depending on the condition, 
two or three female experimenters (E1, E2 and E3) conducted the testing. E1 always manipulated 
the two distributor puppets and asked the test questions. In the first-party condition, E2 
manipulated one recipient puppet; the child served as the other recipient. In the third-party 
condition, E2 and E3 manipulated two recipient puppets. The child and the experimenters sat at a 
child-sized table, E1 always on one side of the table and everybody else (the child, E2 and E3) 
on the opposite side (see Figures 4 and 5 for the set-up).  In the First-party condition, the child 
sat next to E2; in the Third-party condition, the child sat between E2 and E3. The procedure 
started with E1 playing a ball or a shape-sorting game on the table with the child, to make sure 
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the child felt at ease. Then E1 introduced the “pling machine” and let the child put a few small 
toys in it. 
3.2.3.1 Training  Because piloting showed that many children had difficulties (a) paying 
attention to the numbers of items during distributions and (b) remembering which puppet had 
been fair and which had been preferring, a non-social training phase with "arrow pads" was 
administered before the testing. E1 sat across from the child and placed two plastic containers 
between herself and the child. She then put one of the pads ("V" or "II", with arrows pointing to 
either two or one container, correspondingly) on the table and retrieved two small wooden blocks 
from a bag. She asked the child to watch what she will be doing. She moved the two blocks 
slowly, following the arrows on the pads, and put the bocks into the containers, saying: "Look, 
with this pad I am putting both blocks in one bowl, and there is nothing in the other" (II-pad) or 
"Look, with this pad I am putting one block in this block and one block in that bowl" (V-pad). 
She repeated it four times in the following order: II-pad pointing to one bowl, V-pad pointing to 
both bowls, II-pad pointing to the second bowl, V-pad pointing to both bowls.  
After the non-social training, E2 (and E3 if applicable) produced the recipient puppets 
from a box and put them on their hands (one puppet per person). The recipient puppets were 
anthropomorphic, and their gender was matched to that of the child. They looked similarly 
except wearing different clothes. E1 introduced the puppets by name and stated that they liked to 
play with the “pling machine”. The puppets “talked” as well, repeating what E1 said. E1 gave a 
toy to each of the recipients and encouraged them to throw them in the machine. Then the main 
tasks began.  
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3.2.3.2 Testing   E1 started by announcing that some animals will come and give different things 
to throw in the pling machine to the recipients. Each of the four tasks consisted of a 
demonstration phase and a test phase.  
Demonstration phase  E1 adjusted her chair to that she sat in front of the two recipients, 
equidistant from them. She placed two distribution items (depending on the task, marbles, 
wooden balls, toy dice or wooden bananas) on the table in front of her and brought (and wore on 
her hand) one of the distributor puppets: depending on the order, either the Fair one (F) with the 
"V"-pad or the Preferring one (P) with the "II"-pad. The pad was laid on the table in front of the 
distributor, so that the arrows point, correspondingly, either to two recipients ("V") or both to 
one of the recipients (“II”). To draw the child's attention to the situation, the recipient puppet(s) 
said "I wonder if I'll get to play!" before the distribution. The distributor puppet (manipulated by 
E1) then moved the two items toward the recipients, in two different manners for F and P. F gave 
one item to each recipient and said: "I will give one [item] to you and one [item] to you, because 
that way each gets the same". P gave both items to one of the recipients and said: "I will give 
both [items] to you because I like you". The recipients threw the items that they received in the 
pling machine and stated how many items they received. The recipient puppet who did not get 
any items "sighed" and assumed a sad posture. This was repeated twice. For the script that was 
used, see Appendix C.  
Test phase  After the demonstration was over, E1 moved her chair to sit directly across 
from the child, and put both distributor puppets on her hands and the corresponding "V" and "II" 
pads on the table in front of them, to remind the child which distributor behaved fairly and which 
behaved preferentially. She then asked the child to choose one of the distributors in response to 5 
prompts: 
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1. "There are two more [items]; which animal should distribute them next?" 
2. "Which one was nice?" 
3. "The animals want to play, too, and here is one [item]; who will you give it to?" 
4. "I found two more [items], who will you give it to?" 
5. "One animal has to leave now and the other will stay and play with you; which one 
should stay?" (see Appendix C for the detailed script). 
The order of the first and fifth questions was kept constant because this order was the most 
natural: the "next distribution" came right after the last distribution of the demonstration phase; 
at the end of the whole interaction, one animal left and the other stayed to play a game with the 
child. The order of questions (2), (3) and (4) was counterbalanced across subjects.  
3.2.3.3 Coding and reliability  Children's choices of distributors were coded in response to each 
of the 5 measures for the 4 tasks. The choice of the Fair puppet was coded as 1 and the choice of 
the Preferring puppet was coded as 0. For the 2-item distribution measure, giving both items to F 
was coded as 1, giving both items to P was coded as 0, and distributing the items equally was 
coded as .5. A single coder coded all the data; to assess reliability, a second coder, blind to the 
hypotheses of the study, coded 25% of children at each age. The agreement between the coders 
was 100%.  
3.3 RESULTS  
Each child was administered 4 trials, with different distributor puppets acting in each trial. 
Within each trial, after the demonstration (in which the Fair distributor behaved fairly and the 
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Preferring distributor favored someone), the child was asked to choose one of the distributors in 
response to three questions and asked to give objects to them twice. There were thus 5 outcome 
measures for each of the 4 trials. For each measure, we coded the choice of the puppet and 
calculated on how many trials the child chose the Fair puppets (0-4). Because some children did 
not complete all the trials, the proportion of the times the child chose the Fair puppets out of the 
completed trials was calculated and used in the following analyses.  
The first set of analyses aimed to determine whether children displayed preferences for 
either the Fair or the Preferring puppets. To test whether their choices were significantly 
different from chance, we used one-sample t-tests with a test value of .5 on the proportion of 
choices in favor of the Fair puppets, applied separately for the five response measures and the 
four combinations of age and condition. 
Table 4 shows the mean proportions of choosing the Fair puppets for each outcome 
measure, for the two conditions and the two ages. Note that, since the responses were 
dichotomous (choosing either one puppet or the other), lower proportions of “choosing the Fair” 
also mean higher proportions of “choosing the Preferring”, and vice versa. 
In the first-party condition, 3.5-year-olds chose the Fair puppets less often than chance in 
response to the question “Who was nice?” (t (23) = -3.05, p < .01), and showed a trend for 
choosing the Fair puppet significantly less than chance when asked to distribute one toy to the 
puppets (t (23) = -2.02, p = .056). In the third-party condition, 3.5-year-olds chose the Fair 
puppet significantly more often than chance on two measures: in response to the questions “Who 
should distribute [x] next time?” (t (23) = 3.02, p < .01), and “Who was nice?” (t (23) = 2.70, p = 
.01). 
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5.5-year-olds as a group did not show a significant preference for either type of 
distributor in the first-party condition. However, in the third-party condition, their preference for 
the Fair puppets was significantly greater than chance on four measures: in response to the 
questions “Who should distribute [x] next time?” (t (23) = 3.10, p < .01), “Who was nice?” (t 
(23) = 4.40, p < .001), “Who do you want to play with?” (t (23) = 2.60, p < .05), and when asked 
to distribute one toy to the puppets (t (23) = 3.65, p < .01).  
Since it appeared that in some cases children’s preferences were distributed bi-modally 
between choosing the Fair and choosing the Preferring distributors, suggesting that individual 
children might have had strong preferences for either of the two puppets (without showing a 
consistent preference across children), we used Monte-Carlo simulations to test whether such a 
pattern could have arisen from chance.1 The Monte-Carlo simulations revealed that 5.5-year-
olds’ responses were significantly different from random distributions in the first-party condition 
on the four measures that were not significant when the group means were compared to chance: 
“Who should distribute next?”, “Who was nice?”, “Who do you want to play with?”, and when 
asked to give one toy to one of the puppets (all p’s < .01). Thus, even though the mean 
proportions were not different from chance, in this condition 5-year-olds were not choosing 
randomly: some children strongly preferred the Fair puppets, and some strongly preferred the 
Preferring puppets. Figure 6 shows the number of children choosing the Fair puppets on the 
majority of the trials, those choosing the Preferring puppets on the majority of the trials, and 
                                                 
1 These simulated children randomly choosing among the two puppets with the number of choices corresponding to 
the actual number of choices per child. We compared the children’s preference score with that simulated by 
measuring the absolute deviation of the proportion of choosing the Fair puppets from the expectation (.5) and 
averaging that score across the children (the possible range of this test statistic is 0 - .5). We ran 1000 simulations 
(into which we included the original data as one ‘simulation’) and determined the P-value as the proportion of 
simulations revealing a test statistic at least as large as that of the actual children. Note that in case of a significant 
one-sample t-test this simulation is not informative, but in case of a non-significant t-test it can reveal a pattern of 
individual preferences. 
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those choosing the Fair and the Preferring equally often (note the bimodal distribution of the 5.5-
year-olds’ responses in the first-party condition). 
A further set of analyses aimed to determine whether children’s tendencies to choose 
either the Fair or the Preferring distributor differed between the two conditions, and whether 
these tendencies (if any) were different at the two ages. To this end, we conducted a two-way 
ANOVA for each outcome measure, with condition (First-party; Third-party) and age (3.5 years; 
5.5 years) as between-subject factors.2 None of the ANOVAs revealed an interaction. On three 
measures, there was a main effect of condition, with children choosing the Fair puppets more 
often in the third-party than the first-party condition: “Who should distribute next?” (F (1, 92) = 
8.02, p < .01) and “Who was nice?” (F (1, 92) = 15.60, p < .001), and when asked to distribute 
one toy, (F (1, 92) = 10.70, p < .001). There was also a main effect of age, with older children 
choosing the Fair more often than younger children, on the “Who was nice?” measure (F (1, 92) 
= 8.40, p < .01), and a trend in the same direction for two additional measures: in response to 
“Who do you want to play with?” (F (1, 92) = 3.56, p = .06) and when asked to distribute one toy 
(F (1, 92) = 3.72, p = .06).  
Because not all the data were normally distributed, we also conducted Generalized Linear 
Model (GLM, McCullagh & Nelder, 2008) into which we included the two factors and their 
interaction.3  The GLM revealed largely identical results to those of the ANOVAs, additionally 
                                                 
2 Since we did the analyses separately for each of the five response measures, an error level correction was required. 
We achieved that using Fisher’s omnibus test.  This test combines a number of P-values into a single chi-square 
distributed test-statistic with degrees of freedom equaling twice the number of P-values.  Overall, there were clear 
effects of age and condition on the children’s probability to choose the fair puppet (Fisher's omnibus test, combining 
full null model comparisons of the five GLMs: χ2=82.9, df=10, P<0.001).   3 The model was fitted in R (2.14.2;  R Development Core Team (2011). R: A language and environment for 
statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria.) with binary error structure and logit 
link function (i.e., a logistic model). As a response we used the proportion of choices in favor of the Fair puppet 
(i.e., one value of response per child). As an overall test of the impact of both factors and their interaction we 
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revealing significant main effects of age on the two measures where ANOVAs detected trends: 
for children’s responses to the question “Who do you want to play with?” (Z = 2.24, p = .03) and 
when asked to distribute one toy (Z = 2.48, p = .01).  
Additional correlation analyses on the five measures used in the study (see Tables 5 and 
6) have revealed no relations between any measures for 3.5-year-olds’ responses in the First 
party condition, suggesting no consistency in individual children’s tendencies to choose the Fair 
vs. the Preferring partner in response to the different prompts in the condition when children’s 
own interests were at stake. In the Third party condition, however, 3.5-year-olds responses 
correlated on a number of measures. Specifically, children’s responses to the question “Who 
should distribute next?” were related to their distributions of two items to the puppets, to their 
choice of play partner and judging a puppet as “nice” (in various combinations; a total of 7 
significant correlations). 5.5-year-olds’ responses were consistent across measures in both the 
First party (7 significant correlations) and the Third party condition (5 significant correlations), 
suggesting that individual children who preferred one of the puppets in response to one prompt 
were likely to make the same choice in response to other prompts.  
In summary, the results show an interesting age trend in children's evaluations of 
variously behaving distributors, reflecting the changing balance between valuing selfishness 
and/or reciprocity and valuing universal fairness. In the third-party condition, even 3-year-olds 
judged the fair distributors as more “nice” than the unfair distributors, and more often authorized 
the fair ones to do next distributions. However, in the first-party condition, 3-year-olds judged 
                                                                                                                                                             
initially compared the full model with a null model comprising only the intercept using a likelihood ratio test 
(Forstmeier W, Schielzeth H .2011. Cryptic multiple hypotheses testing in linear models: overestimated effect sizes 
and the winner’s curse. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol., 65, 47–55; Dobson, A. J. 2002. An Introduction to Generalized 
Linear Models. Chapman & Hall/CRC, Boca Raton.). P-values for main effects (i.e., the two factors) we only 
inspected when their interaction was not significant and removed from the model. 
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the distributors who favored them as more “nice” and tended to give them more toys (when 
egalitarian allocation of toys was not possible). Five-year-olds strongly preferred the fair 
distributor in the third-party condition on all the measures, except for the 2-item allocation where 
they distributed equally. In the first-party condition, 5-year-olds as a group did not show 
significant preferences; but additional non-parametric analyses revealed that they were split in 
two major groups, one of which preferred the fair distributor and the other preferred the one who 
was nice to them. 
3.4 DISCUSSION 
In this study we explored the interplay between various motives that guide children’s choice of 
partner in a distributive context. We exposed 3.5-year-old and 5.5-year-old children to two 
distributors: one who was always distributing resources equally to two recipients and one who 
preferentially gave more resources to one of the two recipients. In a first-party condition, the 
child was one of the recipients and was preferred by one distributor; in a third-party condition, 
the child observed distributions to other recipients, one of whom was preferred. The child then 
was asked to choose one of the distributors (the Fair one or the Preferring one) in response to 5 
different prompts. Children’s choices in the third-party condition, when their own interests were 
not involved, were meant to reflect their normative understanding of fairness, whereas their 
choices in the first-party condition involved an additional demand of weighting their self-serving 
interests and/or considerations of direct reciprocity against fairness considerations. 
Overall, the results of the study supported our general prediction that over the preschool 
years, children’s appreciation of fairness—and preference for fair partners—increases, and 
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selfishness decreases. Children at both ages preferred the fair distributors in the third-party 
condition, suggesting that already by 3.5 years, they understand and value fairness and prefer fair 
individuals, even when it does not affect children’s own interests. At 3.5, they chose the fair 
puppet over the preferring puppet in response to two prompts; at 5.5, they did so in response to 
all four prompts that involved a forced choice of one puppet over the other (note that for the one 
measure that allowed to choose both puppets at a time, children opted for this egalitarian choice 
at both ages and in both conditions). In contrast, in the first-party condition, younger children 
never chose fair puppets more than preferring puppets, and on two measures they chose the 
preferring puppets significantly more often that the fair ones. Among 5.5-year-olds, there were 
some who showed the same tendencies, but also some who strongly preferred the fair 
distributors, even though it went against children’s own interests. This costly preference for 
fairness thus seems to emerge around 5 years of age, consistent with Fehr et al. (2008) findings.   
We also had specific hypotheses regarding each measure; not all of them were supported. 
The measure that we thought would contrast selfishness and fairness most directly was the 
question “Who should be the next distributor?”. We hypothesized that in the third party 
condition, children at both ages would choose the fair puppet, and that in the first party 
condition, younger children would choose the preferring and older children would choose the 
fair. Our prediction was met in that in the third party condition, children indeed wanted the fair 
puppet to be the next distributor. However, 3.5-year-olds in the first party condition responded 
randomly, and 5.5-year-olds were split in two groups, one favoring each type of distributor. It 
could be that the question was too challenging for the younger children and they did not quite 
understand its implications. It could also be that the 3.5-year-olds were actually not that 
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interested in acquiring more toys; they were interested in the puppets and liked them all, and the 
question about the next distribution was not salient enough to elicit a strong preference.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the measure that turned out to be the most productive was the 
question “Which of the puppets was nice?”. This measure focused on the evaluation of the 
distributors’ personal characteristics, but possibly also revealed most clearly the children’s 
notion of what was the right thing to do. Consistent with our hypothesis, in the third party 
condition all the children chose the fair distributor; in the first party condition younger children 
chose the preferring distributor, and older children, once again, were divided in two groups with 
opposite preferences. All these results were significantly different from chance, and there were 
also significant effects of both age and condition.  
On the other hand, the question “Who do you want to play with?” yielded the least 
meaningful results. One significant result was that 5.5-year-olds chose more often to play with 
the fair than the preferring puppets. 3.5-year-olds seemed to choose the play partner randomly in 
both conditions. Since it was clear from the experimenter’s behavior that the game for which the 
puppet was being chosen was unrelated to the distribution game, the question might have been 
too far removed from the context of evaluating the partners’ fairness.  
Finally, asking children to give one and two items to the distributors revealed the same 
pattern that several other studies, including our Study 1, have previously found. When two items 
were available, the vast majority of children followed the “default” equality principle, giving one 
to each puppet. However, when there was only one item, children behaved consistently with their 
general patterns for each condition: in the first party condition, younger children tended to give 
the one item to the preferring puppet; in the third party condition, older children gave it to the 
fair puppet. This measure might have provided the closest approximation of direct and indirect 
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reciprocity, as it asked for the same type of behavior from the child as his partners just displayed 
toward him. The results thus suggest that younger children tend to use direct reciprocity and 
older children are able to use indirect reciprocity in their evaluative and distributive decision-
making. 
The general conclusion from Study 2 is that by age 3.5, children begin to understand and 
value fairness in third-party situations, but not when the fair actor’s behavior conflicts with 
children’s own interests. By age 5, children develop a strong preference for fairness, and some of 
them prefer fair partners even when it is disadvantageous to them. This developmental period 
thus seems to be the time when universal norms of fairness grow in importance and can override 
children’s self-regarding motives. 
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4.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The classic picture of children's sense of fairness in the context of distributive justice has 
remained in place for some time. In that picture, preschool children were almost completely 
selfish, or perhaps occasionally generous, but not in any sense fair in distributing resources 
among themselves and others (Damon, 1977; 1980). Fairness was thought to be beyond their 
comprehension and competence, perhaps for purely cognitive reasons or perhaps because it was 
an out-of-reach developmental achievement in moral competence more specifically. 
The current results call this view into question and suggest a much richer and nuanced 
picture of preschoolers' sense of fairness in the context of distributive justice. They do this not by 
undermining the classic findings, but rather by complementing them with new findings using a 
different method of assessing children's competence. The classic results are still valid: when 
preschool children are interviewed verbally about their understanding of fairness in the context 
of distributive justice, they are unable to reason coherently. That is to say, they are incompetent 
when their understanding is measured with the classic Piagetian interview technique, which 
demands explicit, verbally articulated knowledge. But a new wave of research has emerged in 
the past decade or two which examines children's competence in various domains of prosocial 
and moral development not by asking for verbal articulation, but by asking for behavioral 
competence in decision-making. Children are asked to translate their knowledge into action 
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appropriate to the social context. This requires cognitive competence also, though perhaps of a 
different kind than verbal articulation. 
4.1 MAJOR FINDINGS 
The main finding of the current studies is that 5-year-old children show striking tendencies 
toward fairness of different kinds in distributive justice contexts, and 3-year-old children show 
these same tendencies, though a bit less strongly. These are the first studies to establish these 
competencies in children this young. 
More specifically, in the first study 3- and 5-year-old children were presented with 
situations in which one of two possible recipients of resources was more needy than the other. At 
both ages, the majority of children favored the needy puppet over a more neutral puppet when 
they were given an unequal number of resources to distribute. This suggests that most 
preschoolers recognize when someone is in need, and have a tendency to give that individual 
more resources to meet that need, either directly (e.g., food for the hungry) or indirectly (e.g., 
toys for the injured). But that was in the situation where children were, in a sense, forced to 
choose. When they were given an equally divisible number of resources to distribute, 5-year-olds 
showed that they possess another principle of distributive justice as well, namely, the principle of 
equality in which all individuals receive the same amount of resources. The 5-year-old children 
split almost equally into two groups, those favoring the needy puppet (e.g., dividing the 
resources 3 to 1) and those giving equal resources to both puppets (i.e., dividing the resources 2 
to 2)—with not a single child favoring the non-needy puppet. Most of the 3-year-old children 
also changed their strategy when given an equal number of resources to distribute. The majority 
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now divided the goods between the two puppets equally, much like the 5-year-olds, but the 
interpretive problem is that the remaining 3-year-olds did not reliably favor the needy puppet, as 
they had when distributing an unequal number of resources, but rather roughly equal numbers 
favored the needy and non-needy puppets. 
In the view of Lerner (1974, 2003), there are many different ways to distribute goods 
fairly. Distributing goods to others on the basis of need is one way, and both 3- and 5-year-old 
children clearly followed this principle in the current study. Another way is based on a general 
principle of equality among individuals. Many would consider this the prototypical form of 
fairness—all individuals are considered equal—because it would seem to be the default principle 
when there are no other considerations in play. Roughly half of the 5-year-old children in the 
current study followed this principle over the need principle when both possibilities were 
available (because there were an even number of resources to distribute). This competition 
between principles is important in interpreting children's behavior. If children were simply given 
an even number of resources and told to distribute them between two puppets, one could imagine 
them doing this on the basis of preference for symmetry or numerical equality, without 
considering the equal moral deservedness of the recipients. But in the current study, most of the 
5-year-olds favored the needy puppet when given an unequal number of resources to distribute, 
and roughly half of them did so even with an equal number of resources. This makes the strategy 
of roughly half of the 5-year-olds to divide the resources equally between the two puppets more 
meaningful. The fact that they had a competing tendency to favor the needy puppet makes it 
unlikely that they were just dividing the resources in a symmetrical fashion because there was 
nothing else compelling to do. They had something else compelling to do, indeed something 
morally compelling to do, and many of them chose to divide equally nevertheless. This suggests, 
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although of course it does not prove, that the 5-year-old children were in a mode of moral 
decision-making and so their equal divisions were based on some kind of moral principle. The 
fact that the 3-year-olds, when given an equal number of resources, either divided them equally 
or behaved randomly makes this argument less available for them. Although they did favor the 
needy puppet when given an unequal number of resources, when given an equal number of 
resources they did not show (by favoring the needy puppet more than the non-needy puppet) that 
they were in a moral decision-making mode. 
Thus, the overall conclusion from the first study is that both 3- and 5-year-old children 
understand and operate competently with the principle of need in distributing resources. This is 
one form of distributive justice. Five-year-old children also understand and operate competently 
with the principle of equality in distributing resources, and their tendency to use this principle is 
of approximately equal strength is their tendency to use the principle of need. Three-year-old 
children's understanding and competence with the principle of equality is not certain at this point, 
until we can more confidently rule out non-moral strategies for their equal divisions. 
This finding, along with other recent findings concerning children's behavior in situations 
where more than one type of fairness is in play (e.g., Olson & Spelke, 2008; Kenward & Dahl, 
2011; Baumard et al., 2012; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012), is also potentially challenging for 
the classic theories of stable stage-like progressions from simple principles (i.e., equality) to 
complex ones (i.e., equity and need). Taken together, findings from these studies show that 
young children may have several principles operating at the same time, and what changes with 
age is the flexibility with which they are able to balance them.  
Whereas the first study put into competition two principles of distributive justice, 
equality and need, the second study put into competition one principle of distributive justice, 
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equality, with the child's own self-serving motives. Once again the findings were quite clear for 
the 5-year-olds. When they were third-party observers, children of this age evaluated a 
distributor much more positively if he had distributed fairly (equally) among two recipients than 
if he had favored one of them with more resources. When the child herself was one of the 
recipients, the 5-year-old children split in the way they reacted to the distributors, forming two 
major groups (along with a smaller group that behaved inconsistently). Roughly half of the 
children evaluated the distributor most positively who distributed equally between the child and 
another recipient, whereas the other half favored the distributor who had given more resources to 
the child. Much like in the first study, the competition between children's response tendencies 
helps in the interpretation, and in addition the third-party condition helps to reinforce the view 
that children's understanding and competence with the equality principle is not just based on 
their desire to divide things up symmetrically. Thus, in the third-party condition, when they 
themselves were not a recipient, children of this age clearly favored someone who distributes 
among recipients equally. In this study they did not themselves distribute, and even if they did 
show some preference for a symmetrical distribution as produced by someone else, the questions 
they answered about the distributor went way beyond this. Children evaluated the puppet who 
distributed equally as being nicer, they preferred him to be the next distributor, they wanted to 
play with him, and they actually gave him more when they themselves distributed reciprocally in 
return—none of which would follow directly from any preference for seeing resources 
distributed symmetrically for some non-moral reason. When children themselves were one of the 
recipients, they of course had obvious reasons to favor the puppet who favored them. 
Nevertheless, in a pattern not unlike in the first study, in this first-party situation one major group 
of the 5-year-old children favored the equal distributor and the other major group favored the 
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distributor who favored them. Thus, once again, it appears that children of this age have two 
competing tendencies—in this case a selfish tendency and a tendency toward equality in 
distributive justice—that can potentially compete with one another. And it turns out, empirically, 
that in the situation tested here these two tendencies are of roughly equal strength for 5-year-
olds.  
The 3-year-olds also favored equal distributors in the third-party condition, when they 
themselves were not a recipient, most clearly for two of the measures. But, in contrast to the 5-
year-olds, when they themselves were a recipient in the first party condition, these younger 
children often favored the distributor who favored them (again for two of the measures 
especially). For the most straightforward and evaluative question—who is nicer—the 3-year-olds 
chose the equal distributor in the third-party condition, but chose the distributor who favored 
them in the first party condition. As in the case of the 5-year-olds, 3-year-old children's 
answering of specific questions about the distributor in the third-party condition would suggest 
that they were making social or moral judgments about the distributor, not just preferring a 
symmetrical distribution for non-moral reasons. But, in contrast to the 5-year-olds, these younger 
children clearly valued their own personal interests more strongly than they valued fairness in a 
distributor when these were put in direct competition. The explanation for this developmental 
difference was not a part of the current investigation directly. But one obvious explanation would 
be that 3-year-old children are more selfish than 5-year-old children, either in the sense that their 
selfish motive is stronger or in the sense that their ability to comprehend and value the principle 
of equality is weaker. It is also possible that children of both ages are capable of operating in 
similar ways when selfish tendencies and the principle of equality conflict, but 5-year-old 
children are sensitive to how selfish behavior appears to others (in this case the adult 
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experimenters, who were in the room with them) in a way that 3-year-olds are not. This latter 
possibility gains credence from the fact that the youngest age at which children have been shown 
to have a concern for self-reputation is around 5 years of age (Banerjee, 2002; Engelmann et al., 
2012). 
Thus, the overall conclusion from the second study is in general agreement with the first. 
Five-year-old children clearly understand and operate with some kind of principles of fairness, in 
this case impartial equality. Moreover, the findings of this second study provide more positive 
evidence that the 3-year-old children also understand and operate with the principle of equality. 
Even though they made choices favorable for themselves more often than did the 5-year-olds, in 
the third-party condition 3-year-old children judged that a distributor was “nicer”, and they 
wanted him to be the next distributor, when he had previously distributed equally. To reiterate 
the above argument, the fact that they answer these kinds of questions reliably suggests that 3-
year-olds’ tendency to themselves distribute equally in the first study was not just a result of 
some sort of aesthetic preference for symmetry. Although we cannot be nearly as confident in the 
results for the 3-year-olds as for the 5-year-olds in these studies, our hypothesis is that 3-year-
olds also understand and operate with some kind of principle of equality, even if it is not as 
strong as it is for the older children. 
Interestingly, the issue of preference for equal, or egalitarian, distributions came up in 
Study 2 again when children were asked to give two objects to the two distributor puppets. At 
both ages and in both conditions, children in this situation distributed equally by giving one 
object to each puppet. This is in contrast to their distributions of one object to the same puppets: 
in that situation, when forced to make a choice, 3-year-olds in the first-party condition tended to 
favor the preferring puppet, and 5-year-olds in the third-party condition favored the fair puppet. 
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This discrepancy reflects the equality bias, noted above for Study 1 and also observed in other 
studies (Olson & Spelke, 2008; Kenward & Dahl, 2011; Baumard et al., 2012).  
4.2 METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Some developmental researchers might claim that it is not only 3- and 5-year-olds who 
understand and operate with principles of fairness (especially equality), but that even 15-month-
old infants do as well. This would be based on recent findings that even infants of this young age 
display looking-time differences in response to distribution events that end up in inequality as 
opposed to equality (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). These studies 
controlled for a simple expectation of symmetry by having infants also view resources laid out in 
equal and unequal manners in the absence of any active distribution by a person. Nevertheless, 
the fact that infants expect to see people distribute equally says nothing about their moral 
judgment of whether that is a good thing to do, or a fair thing to do, and whether they themselves 
would choose to do it. It is surprising that infants this young have tuned into distribution events 
and their outcomes in such a way so as to form firm expectations, and these expectations are 
indeed relevant—we may think of them as developmental precursors—to moral actions and 
judgments proper. But expecting equal distributions is not the same thing as actually choosing to 
do them or judging people more positively when they do them. 
So, the claim that the current studies are the first to tell us that preschool children have a 
more nuanced sense of fairness than previously thought rests at least partially on a 
methodological claim, or actually a pair of methodological claims. The first is that while verbal 
interviews are a valid measure of children's understanding and competence with principles of 
 63 
distributive justice, they are the same time too demanding. It does not seem correct to say that a 
world champion chess player or Nobel prize-winning mathematician is not fully competent in 
their chosen profession (or that prelinguistic infants and animals are cognitively incompetent in 
general) because they are unable to articulate clearly in language what it is they are doing when 
they play chess or prove mathematical theorems. If they can articulate in language what they are 
doing, so much the better, and this displays a reflective knowledge that may indeed be 
considered “higher” or more secure or more explicit than straightforward cognitive competence 
as displayed in behavioral decisions. Such cognitive competence—again, when this includes 
decision-making appropriate to context  —reflects a full and important form of knowledge and 
competence, just not one that is fully reflective and explicit.  
On the other hand, expectations are not moral judgments, as they completely lack the 
normative element—the judgment about how things should work—which are the essence of 
moral judgments. So, the looking time studies do not establish that 15-month-olds have a sense 
of fairness. They provide us with very important information about children's competencies, and 
in some domains they may be sufficient to establish the foundations of children's knowledge, 
perhaps especially in the physical world. But judgments of fairness, and other moral judgments 
including a normative dimension, would seem to require some evidence from the child going 
beyond just what they expect and do not expect to occur in the social world. 
Thus, the methodological approach of the current study has favored the level of 
behavioral decision-making over explicit verbal descriptions, on the one hand, and over looking 
time methodologies, on the other. One could argue that from an evolutionary perspective, the 
level of behavioral-decision making is basic, as natural selection does not operate on verbal 
descriptions or on expectations that do not translate themselves into adaptive action. Rather, 
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natural selection operates on making adaptive choices in action (Alcock, 2001; Henrich, 2004). 
But this is a methodological issue faced not just by this study or this topic area alone, but rather 
by the field of developmental psychology as a whole. Our view is that all three of these methods 
lead to valid assessments of young children's knowledge and competence, and it may be simply 
that some of them are more appropriate in some topic areas rather than others. Most relevant 
here, we would claim that when normative judgments about what is the fair or right thing to do 
are involved, the level of behavioral decision making is sufficient to establish this normative 
dimension without being too linguistically demanding. 
4.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The classic Piagetian model of cognitive development is a stage model, with a new mode of 
functioning transforming and replacing an older mode. The classic work on children's sense of 
distributive justice by Damon (1977; 1980) and others had this model as an implicit 
developmental theory. Preschool children were considered selfish and incapable of thinking 
about justice and equality and taking into consideration their behavioral decision-making. Then 
in early school age children become egalitarian and concerned with treating all others on an 
equal basis, followed in later school age by more complex considerations in which they take into 
account such factors as the needs of recipients or their merit in producing the resources in 
making fairness judgments. Although clearly these theorists recognize that the older tendencies 
do not go away when the new ones emerge, there is a sense that the new way of operating 
transforms the old and is ascendant. 
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As outlined in the introduction, a different way of conceptualizing these matters 
theoretically is a model by the social psychologist Lerner (1974; 2003). In this way of viewing 
fairness—in Lerner's terms "justice"—people of all ages have many different principles they 
employ for making judgments of fairness, including in situations involving distributive justice. 
The major ones on which Lerner focuses are: equality (parity), need, merit (in terms of work 
effort), and social rules (e.g., in competitive games in which the winner deserves the prize 
regardless of any issues of need, merit, or equality). All of these are in constant competition, of 
course, with humans’ selfish motives for maximizing their own gains. Which of these motives is 
(or are) primary, and is (are) determinative in a given act of individual behavioral decision-
making, depends on a number of factors. Most importantly, the weighting of these different 
principles in a given act of decision-making depends on, at least (i) social context; (ii) individual 
differences; and (iii) developmental period. 
First, which motive or motives are critical for determining behavioral decisions in 
distributive justice situations depend on the particular social context. For example, in classic 
paradigms in which preschool children are found to be fairly selfish, children are given some 
resources to possess (Fehr et al., 2008; Blake & Rand, 2010). They are then instructed that they 
may keep all of these resources or give some of them to another child, as they wish (the structure 
is thus that of a dictator game from game theory). Preschool children are selfish in such context 
because they have to give up things that they already possess, which is costly, even painful. This 
effect may be more pronounced in younger children, whose sense of possession, even if just 
emerging, appears to often override other motivations. Indeed, Svetlova et al. (2010) found that 
2-year-old children shared neutral objects with an adult much more readily than they shared 
objects which they owned themselves. In Fehr et al. (2008) study 3- to 4-year-olds consistently 
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chose allocations that maximized the number of their possessions. So in this context, prior 
possession encourages selfish behavior in sharing objects and the distribution of resources. 
But consider another context used in a recent study with pairs of 3-year-old children. 
Hamann et al. (2011) set up situations in which one child of the pair ended up with three 
valuable toys and the other child ended up with only one. The "lucky" child handed one of the 
toys to the "unlucky" child—and so equalized the distribution at two apiece—at drastically 
different levels depending on how the unequal split came about. In the collaboration condition 
children work together to retrieve the toys from the apparatus. In this case, when the toys came 
down, surprisingly, in an unequal manner, the lucky child equalized the distribution by giving 
one toy to the unlucky child in over 80% of the cases. In contrast, if the children simply entered 
the room and saw three toys already in the receiving tray of one side of the apparatus, and one 
toy in the other, the lucky child equalized the distribution by giving one toy to the unlucky child 
in only 10% of the cases. Generating unowned resources collaboratively thus seems to encourage 
in children a tendency to equalize the co-produced resources, perhaps because the collaborative 
activity generates in children a sense of the collaborators being equally deserving of the 
outcome. But when each child finds her own resources on her own side, any sharing that might 
ensue is more like the dictator game, in which she has to give up something that she already 
possesses. In addition, it might be that children in this condition have some implicit 
understanding that the 3/1 split which they find upon entering the room was done by the adults, 
and so this must be the way the game is supposed to be played. The lucky child reasons that she 
is supposed to have three toys, and the other child only one, in this game as it is set up and 
authorized by adults. 
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Another variation involves work effort, or merit. Classically, in the work summarized by 
Damon (1977; 1980), children only took work effort or other forms of merit into account later in 
the school years. It was thought that children start with the sense that everyone is equal, and only 
later are able to make more nuanced judgments that essentially involve a distribution 
proportional to some other factor, such as work effort. But recent research in the same general 
framework as the current research has shown that even preschool children take merit into 
account when that plays a salient role in generating the resources. Studies by Baumard et al. 
(2012), Kanngiesser & Warneken (2012), and Hamann et al. (in press) all found that when 
preschool children perceive that one individual put in more effort to generate resources, that 
individual deserves a greater proportion of the generated rewards. So in this context, fairness 
does not mean equality among persons as individuals, but something more along the lines of 
equality per unit of work effort. 
From the point of view of Lerner's theory, different principles of distributive justice are 
appropriate, and so are utilized by individuals, in different contexts. What we have highlighted 
here is differences in how the resources are generated and the role played by the different 
recipients, if any, in generating the resources. Children have as part of their knowledge and 
competence several different principles that they and others would consider fair ways of 
distributing goods in different circumstances. And, of course, there may be other situations in 
which it might be appropriate to favor oneself or to favor one's friend or kin with goods—though 
it might be debatable whether those could be justified by an appeal to fairness, or whether they 
must be justified by an appeal to some other principle like loyalty to one's self, friends, or kin. 
Second, the weighting of different principles of fairness or justice, and how they might 
compete with other principles of individual decision-making such as selfishness and favoritism, 
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obviously differ as well for different individuals regardless of context. Thus, it would seem 
obvious that some individuals are more selfish than others across contexts, some individuals are 
more sympathetic than others toward the concerns of other people, some individuals are more 
assiduous rule followers than others, and some individuals become more upset when undeserving 
people get rewarded (cheater detection) (Haidt, 2012). Such individual differences might be part 
of the natural variation of human behavioral preferences and personality, they might be due to 
different socialization experiences, or they might derive from some combination of the two. A 
productive future direction would be to assess, along with measures of fairness understanding 
such as the ones in our studies, various factors that could be related to individual differences in 
children's fairness-related responses. Unfortunately, we were not able to use questionnaire 
measures in either study. Future studies could use data from such instruments as Strengths and 
Difficulties Questionnaire (Goodman, 1997), Children’s Behavior Questionnaire (Rothbart et al., 
2001), Parental Socialization Goals Questionnaire (Keller et al., 2006) and others. It would also 
be interesting to see whether children's exposure to and interaction with other children (including 
siblings and peers at daycare centers) could be associated with differences in children's own, and 
their evaluation of others', fairness-related behavior.  
Whatever their origin, Haidt (2012) makes an interesting case that an important outcome 
of such individual differences (along with some other similar dimensions that he identifies) is 
people's attitudes towards society as a whole and political institutions in particular. Thus, in the 
American context, people who are more comfortable with selfish motives, more strict followers 
of rules (including respect for authority), more loyal to their group and negative toward rewards 
for undeserving individuals (cheaters), etc., tend to lean more to the right politically, whereas 
individual high on sympathy for others in need tend to lean more to the left politically. This is a 
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very "far cry" from the 3- and 5-year-olds distributing toys in the current study, but it has an 
interesting potential implication that individual differences in how preschoolers interact with 
puppets might predict in the long run how they relate to the society into which they are born 
more generally.  
Third, the different principles of fairness/justice as elaborated by Lerner (and perhaps 
other relevant principles) might differ in their weighting across development. The pattern might 
be one reminiscent of the classic picture in some ways but still be importantly different because 
of the way the dimensions of fairness are thought to interact with one another. The results of the 
current study, along with those of many others, would suggest that it is indeed the case that 
young preschoolers often do behave more selfishly than school-aged children (and the current 
first study, along with many others, would seem to rule out that young children cannot identify 
others’ needs in straightforward cases). But it is still a question whether that is due to selfishness 
being a stronger motive, sympathy for others' needs being a weaker motive, or socialization into 
rules of fairness having had less time to work. The second study here suggests at least a tentative 
answer. Both 3- and 5-year-olds were more positive about a puppet who distributed fairly than 
one who favored one individual when this judgment was made from a third-party perspective. So 
children of both ages would seem to share the equality principle in this situation. But when they 
themselves were one of the recipients, 3-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, switched to preferring the 
puppet who favored them. Importantly, this included their judgment about who was “nice”, in 
which they identified as nice the fair puppet in the third-party context but the puppet who 
favored them in the first party context. This pattern of results would seem to suggest that it is not 
that young preschoolers cannot identify and sympathize with others' needs in straightforward 
situations (they do this in the first study), and it is not that they do not appreciate individuals who 
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are fair toward others (they do this in the third-party condition of the second study). It is simply 
that they seem to value their own individual needs and/or desires in situations of distributive 
justice more than do older children.  
The results of the first study suggest that 3-year-olds give more weight to the principle of 
equality than to the principal of need. When they were given an equal number of resources to 
divide, the majority of them divided the shares equally and the others had no preference for the 
needy versus the non-needy puppet. The 5-year-olds gave equal weight to the principle of 
equality and the principle of need, as when they were given an equal number of resources to 
divide, roughly half of them did so on the basis of equality and half of them did so on the basis of 
need. This developmental ordering is again somewhat reminiscent of the classic picture in which 
children are first egalitarian and then take into account other factors, but of course displaced in 
age downward by several years. What all of this might mean is that the classic account in which 
young children go from selfish to equal (egalitarian) to equity-based (equality tempered by the 
merit and need) still holds up to the facts quite well. It is just that when they need to express 
themselves in verbal justifications, this developmental pattern is displayed several years later 
than when they express themselves in behavioral decision-making. Also, as noted above, the 
theoretical conceptualization is different because it is not that children at a particular age are 
overall selfish or egalitarian—they are capable of acting with respect to any of four or more 
principles of fairness in distributive justice contexts from at least 3 years of age—it is that in the 
current conceptualization the ordering of those different principles in their behavioral decision-
making may be different at different developmental periods. 
In this theoretical framework, then, the key is not just to investigate children's behavior in 
operating with one of the principles of fairness/justice, but rather, as in the current studies, to put 
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them into competition with one another (and/or with other principles of behavioral decision-
making, such as selfishness). If children from 3 years of age are capable of operating with 
several different principles of fairness depending on the particular situation, then a systematic 
research program would be to map preferences within a situation across age, and then compare 
across situations as well. It is only with such “competition” experiments that we will be able to 
determine the structure of children's sense of fairness at any given age. 
The developmental progression in fairness understanding evidenced by the current 
study’s findings could be explained by several processes taking place during early childhood. 
Consistent with previous literature on moral development, we found clear indications that older 
preschoolers are more concerned with the welfare of others than are younger preschoolers. This 
may be one of the manifestations of the increasing role of “collective identity” (Ruble et al., 
2004; Amiot, De la Sablonniere, Terry, & Smith, 2007), when in addition to a personal self the 
child begins to represent herself as a part of a group, a “collective self”, and is able to identify 
with others’ subjective interests and needs. At the same time, children’s social-cognitive 
abilities, such as understanding of others’ mental states, also grow in complexity during this 
period. Studies that investigated the role of theory of mind in prosocial behavior and judgment 
have found that children who passed the false belief task (typically around the age of 4, i.e., the 
transitional period between our study’s two age groups) were sharing more generously in the 
Ultimatum Game (Takagishi et al., 2010) and were able to make more nuanced judgments about 
moral transgressions (e.g., were less likely to punish accidental transgressors; Killen et al., 2011) 
than those who did not pass false belief tasks.  More advanced theory of mind skills could thus 
be a part of the developmental picture that contributed to the differences in 3-year-olds’ and 5-
year-olds’ fairness-related decisions.  
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Finally, one other dimension of developmental change in children's moral development, 
that can be relevant for the current findings, is suggested by Tomasello and Vaish (2013). They 
propose that the prosocial and moral behavior of children younger than 3 years of age might be 
based not on abstract social norms and rules that apply to everyone alike, as is the case for adults. 
Rather, the prosocial and moral behavior of 2-year-olds, for example, might be based on a 
concern for the particular individual or on a sense of equality between two particular individuals, 
such as my sister and myself. This is the so-called second-personal dimension of adult morality 
in which, for example, one individual makes a promise to another and so owes a debt to her 
specifically. In adults, this is reinforced by a general rule that one should keeps one's promises in 
general, but the proposal is that 2-year-old children do not have these general rules and so they 
are only operating with second-personal moral inclinations. In this view, then, we might expect 
some instability and lack of consistency in the moral behavior and judgments of children below 3 
years of age as they are responding to particular situations based on a number of idiosyncratic 
characteristics of the person involved. Older children's more norm-based moral behavior and 
judgments are more consistent because they are based on more abstract, cross-situational, agent-
neutral principles. 
4.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Several limitations of the current studies must be noted. First, as with many experimental studies, 
the ecological validity of our experiments could be questioned. The children were tested by adult 
experimenters and could have tried to behave in a manner that would, in the children’s view, 
please the adults or correspond to the adults’ expectations. This is possible but not very likely, 
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because we did our best to embed the experimental situations in a playful context and ensure that 
the children were engaged with the tasks. A more likely threat to ecological validity, however, 
could come precisely from that playful context. The children knew that they were “playing a 
game”; their partners were funny talking puppets; the whole situation was quite far removed 
from real life. Perhaps modeling more realistic situations, especially involving peers, could be a 
more productive approach to exploring the same questions. Another related issue might have 
been task complexity. Despite our efforts to make the tasks as simple as possible, younger 
children in our sample might have had some difficulties with sustaining attention during the tasks 
and remembering the individual puppets’ situations.  
Second, as already mentioned, we unfortunately did not have access to children’s 
demographic information (such as number of siblings or hours spent at daycare) or other 
variables that could have potentially been useful in explaining individual differences. In both 
studies, whereas 3-year-olds were fairly homogeneous—or, fairly equally dispersed—in their 
performance, 5-year-old children showed a few distinct patterns of responses and could be 
classified into distinct groups according to their strategies, suggesting that by this age, some 
additional variables could contribute to marked individual differences. These varialbles could 
include temperamental characteristics as well as environmental influences, such as parental 
attitudes and values, parenting techniques, and children’s experiences at daycare centers. Recent 
studies have shown, for example, that already in toddlerhood, parental discourse about others’ 
mental states, and especially parental elicitation of children’s mental state talk, is related to 
children’s emotional competence and other-regarding behavior (Denham, S., Bassett, H., & 
Wyatt, 2007; Brownell et al., 2013). One could speculate, therefore, that children whose parents 
draw their attention to fairness-related issues would be more competent at making appropriate 
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distributive decisions. Parents’ own ethical and political views, e.g. their preference for 
egalitarian, meritocratic or need-based distributions of goods could also influence their 
socialization of values and affect children’s fairness-related behavior. 
In addition to the family environment, the role of overall culture in which the child is 
born and raised could not be underestimated. In adults, the degree to which a society is involved 
in market exchange has been shown to correlate with Ultimatum and Dictator game 
performance: more exposure to a market economy is associated with more equal offers to an 
anonymous other (Henrich et al., 2010). Differences in children’s distributive justice decisions 
across cultures have also been reported, although findings are not entirely consistent with those 
of studies with adults. For example, in a cross-cultural study by Rochat et al. (2009), 3- to 5-
year-old children growing up in small-scale urban and traditional societies showed less self-
interest and made more equal distributions than children from industrialized societies. On the 
other hand, a recent study comparing Western children to children from two small-scale societies 
in Africa (Schaefer et al., 2013) has found that in highly hierarchical traditional societies children 
tend to base resource allocations more on “arbitrary” principles (e.g. recipient’s rank) than on 
either equality or merit. It would be interesting to administer the experiments reported here (and 
likely influenced by the Western market-economy values) in more traditional and/or more 
collectivist cultures, to investigate whether children in those cultures would be more attuned to 
others’ needs and perhaps more (or, perhaps less) likely to value equal distributions.  
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls (1971) surveys all of the different considerations that people and 
their political representatives might take into account—indeed, ought to take into account—when 
structuring their societal and political institutions. His conclusion is that many of these are 
contentious and problematic unless and until they are boiled down to the distribution of concrete 
resources. Whereas it is not clear what a government could or should do for mental illness or for 
a widow's bereavement, the one thing it can and should do is to find ways of distributing 
resources among its members in ways that are mutually satisfactory. Indeed, in a later book 
Rawls dubs his theoretical conception Justice as Fairness (2001).  
What comes out clearly in this philosophical account is that conceptions of justice and 
fairness in the distribution of resources are many and various and conflict with one another in 
many and various ways in concrete situations. This account fits well with the theoretical 
orientation of the current studies in which even very young children have multiple senses of what 
is fair in distributive justice situations depending on many different considerations. This means 
that there are no simple solutions to many moral and political problems, but that there must 
always be the negotiation in which both facts and values are debated. Perhaps it is not too much 
to hope that a better understanding of how young children begin thinking and acting toward 
others "fairly" in distributive justice situations—reduced to their simplest and most 
straightforward elements—might contribute to our understanding of how these phenomena work. 
Coming back to developmental psychology more specifically, the current findings 
establish with more certainty than any previous findings that preschool children already have a 
sense of fairness in distributive justice contexts. Indeed, they have multiple senses of fairness in 
such contexts, for example, based on equality (everyone deserves the same) and on need (those 
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who are in need should get more resources). Other studies have shown that children this young 
take merit into account as well, and it is almost certainly the case that they believe that most 
adult rules for distributing resources are by that very fact fair. Thus, when we use active 
behavioral decision-making as our measure of children's comprehension and competence rather 
than linguistic competence, and we operate with a pluralistic theoretical framework, we find that 
children as young as 3 years of age are already in possession of the most basic senses of fairness 
that operate in contemporary society. This does not mean that they always use their sense of 
fairness in making behavioral decisions—we have shown here that they are often selfish as 
well—but it means that in situations in which other motives are under control, young children 
can make moral judgments about the distribution of resources that they themselves consider fair. 
These early-emerging senses of fairness then form the basis for their participation in all kinds of 
complex social and political institutions in which only those who at least possess these senses of 
fairness are legitimate participants. 
Much research remains to be done. In particular, the current studies point toward a more 
systematic use of the “competition” methodology in which children's different senses of justice 
are pitted against one another—supported by a theoretical framework providing a unified 
account of these differences. Doing this systematically with all of the different senses of fairness 
available to young children of different ages could potentially provide us with a very detailed 
map of the factors that go into the moral decision-making of children at different developmental 
periods as they face complex social situations with multiple types of fairness potentially at play. 
This map would be at a level of detail not imaginable in the classic theoretical framework in 
which children operate from a kind of unified level of development in their conception of justice 
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at each developmental period (Piaget, 1932; Damon, 1977). In the new theoretical framework, 
this level of detail is not only imaginable but attainable. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
A.1 FIGURES FOR STUDY 1 
 
Figure 1 Materials for Study 1 
Pairs of recipient puppets and the items that children had to distribute 
 79 
 
Figure 2 Set-up for Study 1 
A.2 TABLES FOR STUDY 1 
Table 1 Mean percentage of items given to the needy puppet across all 3 tasks as a 
function of age and distribution condition 
 3-item trials 4-item trials 
3 year olds .62* .55 
5 year olds .63* .62* 
(* = different from chance at .05 level or less.) 
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Table 2 Number of 3-year-old children who favored the different puppets (or gave to 
them equally, where possible) in the three different tasks 
 3-item trials 4-item trials 
HUNGRY Needy 20  Needy 7 
 Other 8  Equal 19 
    Other 2 
SAD Needy 20  Needy 7 
 Other 8  Equal 17 
    Other 4 
ILL Needy 15  Needy 6 
 Other 13  Equal 16 
    Other 6 
 
Table 3 Number of 5-year-old children who favored the different puppets (or gave to 
them equally, where possible) in the three different tasks 
 3-item trials  4-item trials 
HUNGRY Needy 27  Needy 14 
 Other 1  Equal  14 
    Other 0 
SAD Needy 25  Needy 13 
 Other 3  Equal  15 
    Other 0 
ILL Needy 23  Needy 12 
 Other 5  Equal  16 
    Other 0 
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A.3 FIGURES FOR STUDY 2  
 
Figure 3 Materials for Study 2 
The four pairs of distributor puppets; the "pling machine" (here, with a flap that the child had to 
lift in the third party condition); the arrow pads used as identification markers for the Fair 
distributor and the Preferring distributor 
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Figure 4 Set-up for study 2: First Party condition 
(Test phase). The smiley face indicates the child. 
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Figure 5 Set-up for study 2: Third Party condition 
(Test phase). The smiley face indicates the child. 
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Figure 6 Number of children at each age and condition who favored the Fair puppet, 
favored the Preferring puppet, and chose both equally often, in response to 5 measures.  
The lines indicate mean proportions of times choosing either puppet, and stars indicate 
significance of t-test at .5 level. Stars above the body of the graph for the 5.5-year-olds in the 
first party condition indicate significant difference from chance of the distribution of children 
using each strategy (Monte-Carle test). 
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A.4 TABLES FOR STUDY 2 
Table 4 Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the proportions of trials 
on which children chose the Fair puppet 
Measure 3.5-year-olds 5.5-year-olds 
  1st party 3rd party 1st party 3rd party 
"Who should distribute next?" 0.486 (.29) 0.656* (.24) 0.51 (.39) 0.698* (.18) 
"Who was nice?" 0.337* (.26) 0.646* (.22) 0.573 (.45) 0.813* (.31) 
"Who do you want to play with?" 0.49 (.27) 0.438 (.22) 0.51 (.37) 0.646* (.26) 
Child distributes 1 item 0.375 † (.30) 0.563 (.23) 0.479 (.41) 0.698* (.26) 
Child distributes 2 items 0.469 (.08) 0.536 (.10) 0.474 (.12) 0.521 (.16) 
(* = difference from chance at p < .05) 
 
 
Table 5 Correlations between the five measures in Study 2 for 3.5-year-old 
participants, Pearson’s r. 
* = p < .05; ** = p <.01 
 
Condition 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1st 
party 
1. “Who should distribute next?” ,274 ,070 -,040 ,269 
2. “Who was nice?” --- ,244 -,040 ,243 
3. Child distributes 2 items  --- -,082 ,126 
4. Child distributes 1 item   --- -,083 
5. “Who do you want to play with?”    --- 
3rd 
party 
1. “Who should distribute next?” ,739** ,715** ,284 ,405* 
2. “Who was nice?” --- ,561** ,196 ,338 
3. Child distributes 2 items  --- ,539** ,539** 
4. Child distributes 1 item   --- ,469* 
5. “Who do you want to play with?”    --- 
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Table 6 Correlations between the five measures in Study 2 for 5.5-year-old 
participants, Pearson’s r. 
Condition 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1st 
party 
1. “Who should distribute next?” ,804** ,398 ,690** ,800** 
2. “Who was nice?” --- ,384 ,581** ,594** 
3. Child distributes 2 items  --- ,127 ,463* 
4. Child distributes 1 item   --- ,714** 
5. “Who do you want to play with?”    --- 
3rd 
party 
1. “Who should distribute next?” ,456* -,102 ,555** ,313 
2. “Who was nice?” --- ,307 ,478* ,405* 
3. Child distributes 2 items  --- -,124 ,200 
4. Child distributes 1 item   --- ,443* 
5. “Who do you want to play with?”    --- 
* = p < .05; ** = p <.01 
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APPENDIX B 
SCRIPTS FOR STUDY 1 
B.1 TASK 1. ILL PUPPET AND DICE 
E2 holds Molly (with bandage, sad posture, head down) and Sally.  
E1: - Look, this is Molly. Poor Molly, she came right from the hospital. She was sick and 
hasn’t played for a long time. And this is Sally, she is feeling well, she’s been going to 
kindergarten every day and playing a lot with friends. 
Molly (E2): - I really want to play; at the hospital it was so boring. Do you have something for 
me to play with? 
Sally (E2): - I just played a game, and I want to play some more. Do you have something for 
me to play with? 
E1: - OK, I know what we can do! I have some dice here!  
(gets out 4 dice and puts them on the table in front of the child) 
 - Molly and Sally like them. Can you give some dice to them? 
(if the child pushes them all in the middle)  
 - Give some to each puppet! 
(gets out 3 more dice) 
 - Look, I found three more! You can give them to the puppets, too! 
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Molly and Sally (E2) state how many items each of them received, 
e.g. - I got two dice! 
Puppets drop their items in the bag under the table. 
E1 plays ball (or another game) with the child while E2 changes 
puppets. E1 has things to be distributed in the next task ready.   
B.2 TASK 2. HUNGRY PUPPET AND FOOD 
E2 holds Ulf (with dirty bib and fat belly) and Sven (clean bib, sad 
posture, head down). 
E1: - Now, these are Ulf and Sven. Look, Ulf has just eaten, his bib is dirty. And Sven is 
hungry. He hasn’t eaten for a long time. His bib is clean. 
Sven (E2): - I am so hungry, I haven’t eaten for a long time! Do you have some food for me? 
Ulf (E2): - I just ate, but I want some more! Do you have some food for me? 
E1: - We do have something for you!  
(gets out 4 wooden bananas and puts them on the table in front of 
the child). 
 - Ulf and Sven like to eat these. Can you give some to them?  
(if the child pushes them all in the middle)  
 - Give some to each puppet! 
(gets out 3 more pieces) 
 - And there are 3 more. Give them to the puppets, too. 
Ulf and Sven (E2) state how many items each of them received, 
e.g.- I got two bananas! 
Puppets drop their items in the bag under the table. 
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E1 plays ball (or another game) with the child while E2 changes 
puppets. E1 has things to be distributed in the next task ready.  
B.3 TASK 3. SAD PUPPET AND MARBLES 
E2 holds Uwe and Bert (with Velcro tears, sad posture, head 
down). 
E1:  - These are Uwe and Bert. Look, Bert is sad, his cat ran away. He is crying. And Uwe is 
happy, he is having a good day!  
Bert (E2):  - I am so sad. My cat is gone. Can someone comfort me? Do you have something 
I can play with? 
Uwe (E2):  - I feel good today! I also would like to play! Do you have something I can play 
with? 
E1:  - Yes! We have some marbles for you to play! 
(gets out 4 marbles and puts them on the floor in front of the child) 
 - Uwe and Bert love to play with marbles. You can give them to Uwe and Bert. 
(if the child pushes them all in the middle) 
 - Give some to each puppet! 
(gets out 3 more) 
 - And here are three more marbles, give them to them, too. 
Uwe and Bert (E2) state how many items each of them received, 
e.g. - I got two marbles! 
Puppets drop their items in the bag under the table. 
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APPENDIX C 
SCRIPTS FOR STUDY 2 
C.1 “1ST PARTY” CONDITION 
C.1.1 Demo 1 
E1:  - You and [Recipient puppet =R] will play with these different animals, and they will give 
you things to put in the pling machine! Now you will play with [Animal 1, preferring the 
child =P] and [Animal 2, fair =F]. Watch what they do! 
E1 gets F with the V-pad. 
R:  - I wonder if I’ll get to play! 
F:  - I will give one [thing] to you and one [thing] to you, because that way each gets the same. 
(distributes things, E1 encourages the child and R to throw them in 
the machine) 
E1 gets P with the II-pad. 
R:  - I wonder if I’ll get to play! 
P (to the child): - I will give two [things] to you, because I like you.  
(gives both to the child, E1 encourages the child to throw them in 
the machine) 
R:  - F gave one to you and one to me, and P gave both to you. 
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C.1.2 Demo 2 
E1: - Now, they have some more [things]. Let’s see what they do now. 
E1 gets F with the V-pad. 
R:  - I wonder if I’ll get to play! 
F:  - I will give one [thing] to you and one [thing] to you, because that way each gets the same. 
(distributes things, E1 encourages the child and R to throw them in 
the machine) 
E1 gets P with the II-pad. 
R:  - I wonder if I’ll get to play! 
P (to the child): - I will give two [things] to you, because I like you.  
(gives both to the child, E1 encourages the child to throw them in 
the machine) 
R:  - F gave one to you and one to me again, and P gave both to you again. 
F:  - Yes, I gave one thing to each, so that each person gets the same! 
P:  - And I gave all the things to [Child], because I like him/her! 
C.1.3 Test 
For each question, E1 holds the 2 distributor puppets (and their pads) in front of the child, so that 
the child can choose one by naming or pointing. 
 
1. E1: - Now you can decide, which animal will distribute things next. Remember, F gives to 
both of you, and P always gives to you. Who should give things now? 
(let the child point/name. Whoever the child chooses, does his 
distribution first; then the other puppet does his distribution) 
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2. E1: - Now that you saw what they did, what do you think, who was nice? 
(let the child point/name) 
3. E1: - Now, P and F want to play with the pling machine, too, and you will give [things] to 
them. Here, give them these two [things]. 
(hands 2 things to the child; after he distributes, the animals put 
them in the machine) 
  - And here is one more [thing]. Who do you give it to? 
(hands 1 thing to the child; after he gives it to one animal, the 
animal puts it in the machine) 
4. E1: - Now we are going to play another game. (moves all the equipment away and gets the 
[ball] out). One animal will have to leave, and one will stay. Who should stay and play with 
you? 
(let the child point/name. The non-chosen puppet says goodbye and 
goes away (in the box).  
The chosen puppet plays the game with the child) 
REPEAT WITH THE OTHER THREE PAIRS OF DISTRIBUTORS 
C.2 “3RD PARTY” CONDITION 
C.2.1 Demo 1 
E1: - These two puppets, [R1] and [R2], will play with these different animals, and the animals 
will give them things. And you will help [R1] and [R2] to put these things in the pling 
machine! You will help them by lifting this flap... (demonstrates) Now [Animal 1, 
preferring one recipient, =P] and [Animal 2, fair =F] will distribute things. Watch what 
they do! 
E1 gets F with the V-pad. 
R1: - I wonder if I’ll get to play! 
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R2: - I wonder if I’ll get to play! 
F: - I will give one [thing] to you and one [thing] to you, because that way each gets the same. 
(distributes things, E1 encourages the child to hold the flap while 
the recipients throw them in the machine) 
E1 gets P with the II-pad. 
R1: - I wonder if I’ll get to play! 
R2: - I wonder if I’ll get to play! 
P (to R1): - I will give two [things] to you, because I like you.  
(gives both to R1, E1 encourages the child to help R1 throw them 
in the machine) 
R1: - F gave me one. 
R2: - And F gave me one, too. 
R1: - And P gave two to me. 
R2: - And P didn’t give me any.  
C.2.2 Demo 2 
E1: - Now, they have some more [things]. Let’s see what they do now. 
E1 gets F with the V-pad. 
R1: - I wonder if I’ll get to play! 
R2: - I wonder if I’ll get to play! 
F: - I will give one [thing] to you and one [thing] to you, because that way each gets the same. 
(distributes things, E1 encourages the child to help the recipients 
throw them in the machine) 
E1 gets P with the II-pad. 
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R1: - I wonder if I’ll get to play! 
R2: - I wonder if I’ll get to play! 
P (to R1): - I will give two [things] to you, because I like you.  
(gives both to R1, E1 encourages the child to help R1 throw them 
in the machine) 
R1: - F gave me one. 
R2:  - And F gave me one, too. 
R1: - And P gave two to me. 
R2: - And P didn’t give me any.  
F: - Yes, I gave one thing to each, so that each person gets the same! 
P: - And I gave all the things to [preferred puppet], because I like him/her! 
C.2.3 Test 
For each question, E1 holds the 2 distributor puppets (and their pads) in front of the child, so that 
the child can choose one by naming or pointing. 
 
1. E1: - Now you can decide, which animal will distribute things next. Remember, F gives 
equally to the two puppets, and P always gives to one of them. Who should give things 
now? 
(let the child point/name. Whoever the child chooses, does his 
distribution first; then the other puppet does distribution) 
2. E1: - Now that you saw what they did, what do you think, who was nice? 
(let the child point/name) 
3.  E1: - Now, P and F want to play with the pling machine, too, and you will give [things] to 
them. Here, give them these two [things]. 
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(hands 2 things to the child; after he distributes, the animals put 
them in the machine) 
  - And here is one more [thing]. Who do you give it to? 
(hands 1 thing to the child; after he gives it to one animal,  
the animal puts it in the machine) 
4.  E1: - Now we are going to play another game. (moves all the equipment away and gets the 
[ball] out). One animal will have to leave, and one will stay. Who should stay and pay with 
you? 
(let the child point/name. The non-chosen puppet says goodbye and 
goes away (in the box/bag). The chosen puppet plays the game 
with the child) 
REPEAT WITH THE OTHER THREE PAIRS OF DISTRIBUTORS 
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